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The Reviewer  
of The Independent  
Commissioner Against  
Corruption  
South Australia

GPO BOX 2371 Adelaide 5001  
Email: [icacreviewer@sa.gov.au](mailto:icacreviewer@sa.gov.au)

The Honourable John Rau SC,  
Deputy Premier and Attorney-General,  
45 Pirie Street,  
Adelaide SA 5000

Dear Mr Attorney

On 10 March 2017 you appointed me, pursuant to section 61 of the  
*Independent Commissioner against Corruption Act 2012*,  
to review and prepare a report on the operation of the Act since its  
commencement.

I now provide you with my report.

Yours sincerely

  
Kevin Duggan AM QC

# Report of the operation of the *Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012* pursuant to section 61 of the Act

For the period 20 December 2012 to 24 November 2017

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## REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 61 OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONER AGAINST CORRUPTION ACT 2012 ON THE OPERATION OF THE ACT FOR THE PERIOD 20 DECEMBER 2012 TO 24 NOVEMBER 2017

### INTRODUCTION

The *Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012* (the Act) (Annexure A) received the Royal Assent on 6 December 2012. Some sections of the Act commenced on 20 December 2012, but the majority of its provisions came into operation on 1 September 2013.

Section 61 of the Act provides that the Attorney-General must, within five years after the commencement of the Act, cause a report to be prepared on the operation of the Act. A copy of the report must be laid before each House of Parliament.

The Attorney-General has appointed me to prepare this report, the first five-year report on the operation of the Act. Since the commencement of ICAC I have prepared Annual Reports on the operations of ICAC and the OPI as the reviewer of ICAC.

The Act created the office of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (ICAC) and the Office for Public Integrity (the OPI).

The primary objects of the Act, as stated in section 3, were to establish ICAC for the purpose of identifying and investigating corruption in public administration and the prevention or minimisation of corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration. The OPI was established to manage complaints concerning public administration with a view to identifying corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration and to ensure that complaints about public administration were dealt with by the most appropriate person or body.

The two offices commenced operations on 2 September 2013.

### JURISDICTION

At the inception of ICAC, there were five anti-corruption bodies operating in Australian States. These bodies and their dates of commencement are:

The New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption (NSW ICAC) (1988), the Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission (2001) now the Crime and Corruption Commission, the Western Australian Corruption and Crime Commission (2004), the Tasmanian Integrity Commission (2010) and the Victorian Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission (IBAC) (2012).

Although anti-corruption investigation is common to all of these bodies and the South Australian ICAC, they differ from one another in the scope of their

jurisdiction and investigative powers.

The South Australian jurisdiction is primarily confined to conduct by "public officers" as defined in the Act and is concerned with three categories of conduct:

1. Corruption in public administration.
2. Misconduct in public administration.
3. Maladministration in public administration.

An investigation by the Commissioner may also relate to a person who is not a public officer but is alleged to have bribed or corrupted a public officer.

**Corruption in public administration** is defined in section 5(1) of the Act which provides that it is conduct that constitutes –

- (a) an offence against Part 7 Division 4 (Offences relating to public officers) of the *Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935* which includes the following offences:
  - (i) bribery or corruption of public officers;
  - (ii) threats or reprisals against public officers;
  - (iii) abuse of public office;
  - (iv) demanding or requiring benefit on basis of public office;
  - (v) offences relating to appointment to public office; or
- (b) an offence against the *Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995* or the *Public Corporations Act 1993*, or an attempt to commit such an offence; or
- (ba) an offence against the *Lobbyists Act 2015*, or an attempt to commit such an offence; or
- (c) any other offence (including an offence against Part 5 (Offences of dishonesty) of the *Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935*) committed by a public officer while acting in his or her capacity as a public officer or by a former public officer and related to his or her former capacity as a public officer, or by a person before becoming a public officer and related to his or her capacity as a public officer, or an attempt to commit such an offence; or
- (d) any of the following in relation to an offence referred to in a preceding paragraph:
  - (i) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of the offence;
  - (ii) inducing, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the commission of the offence;
  - (iii) being in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the commission of the offence;
  - (iv) conspiring with others to effect the commission of the offence.

**Misconduct in public administration** is defined in section 5(3) of the Act as a contravention of a code of conduct by a public officer while acting in his or her capacity as a public officer that constitutes a ground for disciplinary action against the officer or other misconduct of a public officer while acting in his or her capacity as a public officer.

**Maladministration in public administration** is defined in section 5(4)(a) as-

- (i) conduct of a public officer, or a practice, policy or procedure of a public authority, that results in an irregular and unauthorised use of public money or substantial mismanagement of public resources; or
- (ii) conduct of a public officer involving substantial mismanagement in or in relation to the performance of official functions.

Section 5(4)(b) states that maladministration in public administration includes conduct resulting from impropriety, incompetence or negligence. The conduct referred to in section 5(4) is to be assessed having regard to relevant statutory provisions and administrative instructions and directions (section 5(4)(c)).

It was made clear in the second reading speech in Parliament that, under the bill, ICAC would perform an investigative role and would not have any capacity to lay charges or prosecute matters, this responsibility remaining with existing law enforcement and prosecuting agencies.

## ACTION THAT MAY BE TAKEN

If a matter is assessed as raising a potential issue of corruption in public administration that could be the subject of a prosecution the matter must be –

- (a) investigated by the Commissioner; or
- (b) referred to South Australia Police or another law enforcement agency for investigation (section 24(1)).

The powers of the Commissioner to investigate corruption in public administration are set out below.

If a matter is assessed as raising a potential issue of misconduct or maladministration in public administration, the matter must be dealt with in one or more of the following ways:

- (a) the matter may be referred to an inquiry agency ;
- (b) in the case of a matter raising potential issues of serious or systemic maladministration or misconduct in public administration – the Commissioner may exercise the powers of an inquiry agency in dealing with the matter if satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so;

- (c) the matter may be referred to a public authority and directions or guidance may be given to the authority in respect of the matter.

### THE OPI

The OPI receives and conducts an original assessment of complaints and reports about public administration from members of the public, public authorities and public officers.

The role of the OPI has been described in Annual Reports of the Commissioner and in my Annual Reports to the Attorney- General. It consists of a Manager, a senior assessment officer, a senior assessment officer reviews, other assessment officers, complaints officers and an administrative officer. The senior assessment officers, assessment officers and complaints officers are legally qualified.

Complaints and reports are received by telephone, written correspondence, online, by email or through personal interviews.

Under the original legislation, the OPI was required to undertake an assessment of complaints and reports and then make recommendations to the Commissioner as to whether and by whom those matters should be investigated. As stated below, following amendments to the Act, the OPI now has authority to refer matters raising a potential issue of misconduct or maladministration in public administration to a public authority and give directions and guidance to that authority.

The functions of the OPI have expanded significantly since the commencement of the *Police Complaints and Discipline Act 2016* on 4 September 2017 which entrusts the OPI with the oversight of complaints against the police and the oversight of investigations into police misconduct.

I should add that the OPI undertakes a significant number of functions in addition to those which I have just described.

### THE POWERS OF THE COMMISSIONER TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

As stated above, if the matter is assessed as raising a potential issue of corruption in public administration that could be the subject of a prosecution, it must be investigated by the Commissioner or referred to South Australia Police or other law enforcement agency (section 24(1)).

The powers of the Commissioner to undertake such an investigation are extensive and include coercive measures.

The Commissioner must oversee the investigation (section 27(1)). He is assisted in this respect by trained legal officers and investigators.

Pursuant to section 29 of the Act, he may direct that an examination take place as set out in Schedule 2 of the Act. An examination may be conducted by the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, or an examiner appointed by the Commissioner.

An examiner may summon a person to appear before an examination to give evidence and produce such documents or other things as are referred to in the summons (Schedule 2 cl 4(1)). The evidence may be taken on oath or by affirmation. The person giving evidence before the examiner may be represented by a legal practitioner. The examination must be held in private and the examiner may give directions as to the persons who may be present during the examination or a part of the examination (Schedule 2 cl 3(3)).

Counsel may be appointed to assist the examiner. The examiner may order that proceedings before the examiner not be communicated or provided to any person. Such a direction must be given if the failure to do so might prejudice the safety or reputation of a person or prejudice the trial of a person who has been, or may be, charged with an offence.

Before issuing a summons for a person to appear before the examiner, the examiner must be satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.

It is an offence for a person to fail to attend an examination as required by a summons. It is also an offence for a person to give evidence before the examiner that the person knows is false or misleading in a material particular.

There are other coercive powers which are available under the Act in an investigation into corruption in public administration.

Section 28 of the Act provides that the person heading an investigation into corruption in public administration may, by written notice, require an inquiry agency, public authority or public officer to produce a written statement of information about a specified matter, or to answer specified questions within a specified period and in a specified form. The statement must be verified by statutory declaration if the person heading the investigation so requires.

Section 29 of the Act states that a person may be required to produce a document or thing for the purposes of an investigation into corruption in public administration.

Section 29A of the Act empowers the Commissioner to authorise, by written notice, an investigator to inspect and take copies of financial records in the course of an investigation into corruption in public administration. The section also empowers an investigator authorised pursuant to the section to give directions to, or impose requirements on a deposit holder for the purpose of inspecting and taking copies of the records.

The notice issued pursuant to section 29A is served on a deposit holder such as a bank or friendly society or institution which holds money in accounts on behalf of other persons.

Section 30 of the Act authorises an investigator in an investigation into corruption in public administration to require a person who the investigator reasonably suspects has committed, is committing, or is about to commit, an offence

prescribed by the Act, or who may be able to assist an investigation of a prescribed offence, to state all or any of the person's details and to produce evidence of those details.

Section 34 of the Act provides that the Commissioner may, by written notice, require a South Australian law enforcement agency, inquiry agency or public authority to refrain from taking action in respect of a particular matter being investigated by the Commissioner under the Act or to conduct a joint investigation with the Commissioner in respect of a particular matter and the agency or authority must comply with the requirement even if the agency or authority is otherwise required or authorised to take action under another Act.

### THE EXERCISE BY THE COMMISSIONER OF THE POWERS OF AN INQUIRY AGENCY

As stated above, if a matter is assessed as raising a potential issue of serious or systemic misconduct or maladministration in public administration, one of the options available to the Commissioner is to exercise the powers of an inquiry agency in dealing with the matter if the Commissioner is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so. The Commissioner usually takes into account such matters as the seriousness of the allegations, the likely complexity of the investigation and the seniority of the public officers allegedly involved. More often than not, the powers utilised are those of the South Australian Ombudsman. The Ombudsman has the powers of a commission as defined in the Royal Commissions Act 1917. These include the power to summons witnesses and take evidence on oath, affirmation or declaration

### OVERSIGHT OF ICAC AND THE OPI

#### The Reviewer

Schedule 4 clause 2 of the Act provides for the appointment of a reviewer:

#### 2—Appointment of reviewer

- (1) The Attorney-General must appoint a person (the *reviewer*)—
  - (a) to conduct annual reviews examining the operations of the Commissioner and the Office during each financial year; and
  - (b) to conduct reviews relating to relevant complaints received by the reviewer; and
  - (c) to conduct other reviews at the request of the Attorney-General or the Committee; and
  - (d) to perform other functions conferred on the reviewer by the Attorney-General or by another Act.

Schedule 4 clause 3(1) provides:

#### 3—Reviews

- (1) Without limiting the matters that may be the subject of a review, the reviewer—
  - (a) must, in the case of an annual review, consider the following in relation to the financial year to which the review relates:
    - (i) whether the powers under this Act were exercised in an appropriate manner, including—
      - (A) whether there was any evidence of—
        - maladministration in public administration on the part of the Commissioner or employees of the Commissioner or of the Office; or
        - unreasonable delay in the conduct of investigations under this Act; or
        - unreasonable invasions of privacy by the Commissioner or employees of the Commissioner or of the Office; and
      - (B) whether undue prejudice to the reputation of any person was caused;
      - (ii) whether the practices and procedures of the Commissioner and the Office were effective and efficient;
      - (iii) whether the operations made an appreciable difference to the prevention or minimisation of corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration; and
    - (b) may examine any particular exercises of power by the Commissioner or the Office; and
    - (c) may make any recommendations to the Commissioner or to the Attorney-General that the reviewer thinks fit.

An important component of the annual reviews is to examine the exercise of the coercive powers in corruption investigations by the Commissioner and members of his staff. These powers are far-reaching and it is standard practice for anti-corruption legislation to provide a mechanism for their oversight. Most of the material detailing their exercise is available on the computer programs used by ICAC to store records, documents and videos compiled in the course of investigations. If I need further information, I seek the assistance of the Commissioner and staff members. Also available to me is administrative documentation such as standard operating procedures.

In the course of my Annual Review I read the transcripts of examinations of witnesses called to give evidence at hearings in order to satisfy myself that the hearings are justified and conducted in a fair manner.

Although the reviewer is given power under the Act to inspect all relevant records relating to the exercise of ICAC's powers, the original legislation did not provide any mechanism for persons affected by the exercise of the powers to make complaints concerning the manner of their exercise. This was out of step with legislation regulating anti-corruption bodies elsewhere in Australia.

In my first report, for the period 1 September 2013 to 30 June 2014, I drew attention to the desirability of providing a mechanism for such complaints to be made to me and recommended that consideration be given to amending the legislation accordingly. I pointed out that it was important to confine any such procedure to complaints about conduct in the exercise of the coercive powers and other functions and not to extend it to a review of the appropriateness or otherwise of decisions by ICAC to investigate or decline to investigate complaints or to the merits of conclusions reached or recommendations made by ICAC in relation to matters under investigation.

Amendments to the Act passed in 2016 addressed this issue. There is now provision for persons affected by the exercise of the functions and powers of ICAC to complain about an alleged abuse of power, impropriety or other misconduct on the part of the Commissioner or employees of the Commissioner or of the Office (Fourth Schedule clauses 1 and 2(1)(b)). A website explaining the role of the reviewer and providing a protected facility for making complaints is now in operation.<sup>1</sup>

## THE CRIME AND PUBLIC INTEGRITY POLICY COMMITTEE OF THE PARLIAMENT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

The Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee of the Parliament of South Australia is established under the *Parliamentary Committees Act 1991*. It reviews the operations of South Australian integrity bodies including ICAC and the OPI and reports to Parliament on matters relating to public policy in relation to these bodies. The ICAC Commissioner and I report to the committee annually.

## MAJOR AMENDMENTS TO THE ICAC ACT

Unsurprisingly in the case of a new organisation created by comprehensive legislation, the experience gleaned from the practical operation of ICAC and the OPI since their inception has resulted in various suggestions for improvements in the legislation. This has culminated in two major sets of amendments, the *Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2014* (the 2014 amendments) and the *Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2016* (the 2016 amendments). Most of these amendments were recommended by the Commissioner and his staff.

<sup>1</sup> icacreviewer.sa.gov.au

## THE 2014 AMENDMENTS

These changes to the Act —

- clarified the meaning of the word "publish" in its application to section 56 of the Act which restricts the publication of certain information and evidence associated with ICAC investigations. An amendment to section 4 of the Act defined "publish" to mean publish by —

(a) newspaper, radio or television; or

(b) internet or other electronic means of creating and sharing content with the public or participating in social networking with the public;  
or

(c) any similar means of communication to the public.

The amended definition makes it clear that "publish" does not include communication from one person to another.

- clarified the arrangement whereby police officers who are members of South Australia Police are seconded to ICAC and the police powers which they carry over with them to their employment with ICAC.
- provided for circumstances in which the Commissioner could delegate certain of his duties. This change was specifically to allow the Commissioner to delegate his power to issue search warrants to an examiner.
- empowered the Commissioner to authorize the inspection of financial records by an investigator.
- clarified the delineation between search warrants issued by the Commissioner and those which could be issued by the Supreme Court.

The amending legislation also brought about other changes which have been of assistance in streamlining the operations of OPI and ICAC.

## THE 2016 AMENDMENTS

A number of these amendments were implemented on the initiative of the government to ensure that the Commissioner was able to focus on the more serious matters by assigning more tasks to the OPI. Other amendments gave effect to recommendations made by the Commissioner in his report to the Attorney-General *Review of Legislative Schemes*.

Section 3 of the Act was amended so as to emphasise that the primary object of the Commissioner was to investigate corruption in public administration. This and

other amendments ensured that many matters raising potential issues of misconduct or maladministration in public administration could be referred to an inquiry agency or public authority enabling the Commissioner to concentrate on dealing with serious or systemic maladministration in public administration through the exercise of the powers of an inquiry agency.

In accordance with this aim, the role of the OPI was enlarged so as to empower it to refer complaints and reports to inquiry agencies, public authorities and public officers in circumstances approved by the Commissioner and to give directions or guidance to public authorities in circumstances approved by the Commissioner. Other changes were made to improve the liaison between the OPI and relevant agencies and authorities. As stated previously, prior to this amendment, the OPI was restricted to receiving and assessing complaints and reports about public administration and making recommendations as to whether and by whom they should be investigated to the Commissioner who was not bound by the recommendation.

The 2016 amendments were also aimed at improving the apparatus for issuing warrants.

Further amendments to section 42 of the Act enlarged the power of the Commissioner to publish findings and recommendations resulting from completed investigations in reports to public authorities, the Attorney-General and the Parliament. Restrictions on this power are set out in the section.

Reference has already been made to the extension of the duties of the reviewer so as to enable the reviewer to receive complaints concerning conduct by officers of ICAC or the OPI amounting to abuse of power, impropriety or other misconduct.

The 2016 amendments recast section 54 of the Act so as to clarify the concept of confidentiality in its application to ICAC matters.

Section 56A of the Act was amended so as to enable evidence or information obtained by the otherwise lawful exercise of powers in relation to suspected corruption, misconduct or maladministration public inspiration notwithstanding a jurisdictional error in the exercise of those powers.

Finally, a scheme was introduced into the legislation to regulate the management of claims of privilege over items to be seized under a search warrant.

## COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE

The enactment of the *Police Complaints and Discipline Act 2016* and consequential amendments to the ICAC Act, have had the effect of repealing existing legislation dealing with complaints about the police. The office of Police Ombudsman has been abolished and the OPI is now responsible for the independent oversight of complaints against the police and the oversight of investigations into police misconduct.

## PUBLIC HEARINGS

South Australia is the only State in which the Commissioner has no power to conduct hearings in public except for hearings in relation to the review of legislative schemes or for the purposes of conducting an evaluation of the practices, policies and procedures of inquiry agencies and public authorities with a view to advancing comprehensive and effective systems for preventing or minimising corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration.

In view of the controversy surrounding this issue it is appropriate that I say something about it.

The situation in other jurisdictions is best explained by reference to the relevant legislation in each State.

### New South Wales

*Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988* - section 31

#### Public inquiries

- (1) For the purposes of an investigation, the Commission may, if it is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so, conduct a public inquiry.
- (2) Without limiting the factors that it may take into account in determining whether or not it is in the public interest to conduct a public inquiry, the Commission is to consider the following:
  - (a) the benefit of exposing to the public, and making it aware, of corrupt conduct,
  - (b) the seriousness of the allegation or complaint being investigated,
  - (c) any risk of undue prejudice to a person's reputation (including prejudice that might arise from not holding an inquiry),
  - (d) whether the public interest in exposing the matter is outweighed by the public interest in preserving the privacy of the persons concerned.

### Victoria

*Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Act 2011* – Section 117

#### Examinations generally to be held in private

- (1) Subject to subsection (2), an examination is not open to the public unless the IBAC considers on reasonable grounds—
  - (a) there are exceptional circumstances; and
  - (b) it is in the public interest to hold a public examination; and
  - (c) a public examination can be held without causing unreasonable damage to a person's reputation, safety or wellbeing.
- (2) The IBAC must not hold an examination in public if the examination may disclose particulars likely to lead to the identification of a person who has made an assessable disclosure.



- (3) However, the IBAC may hold an examination in public if the information that may be disclosed is information to which section 53(2)(a), (c) or (d) of the Protected Disclosure Act 2012 applies.
- (4) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b), the factors the IBAC may take into account in determining whether or not it is in the public interest to hold a public examination include, but are not limited to—
  - (a) whether the corrupt conduct or the police personnel conduct being investigated is related to an individual and was an isolated incident or systemic in nature;
  - (b) the benefit of exposing to the public, and making it aware of, corrupt conduct or police personnel misconduct;
  - (c) in the case of police personnel conduct investigations, the seriousness of the matter being investigated.
- (5) Not less than 7 days before a public examination is held, the IBAC must—
  - (a) inform the Victorian Inspectorate that the IBAC intends to hold the public examination; and
  - (b) provide a written report to the Victorian Inspectorate giving the reasons the IBAC decided to hold a public examination in accordance with subsection (1).
- (6) A judicial officer is not required to attend a public examination but may consent to doing so.

## Queensland

*Crime and Corruption Act 2001* - section 177

Whether hearings are to be open or closed

- (1) Generally, a hearing is not open to the public.
- (2) However—
  - (a) for a hearing for a crime investigation, the commission may open the hearing to the public (public hearing) if it—
    - (i) considers opening the hearing will make the investigation to which the hearing relates more effective and would not be unfair to a person or contrary to the public interest; and
    - (ii) approves that the hearing be a public hearing; or
  - (b) for a witness protection function hearing, the commission may open the hearing to the public if it—
    - (i) considers opening the hearing will make the hearing more effective and—
      - (A) would not be unfair to a person or contrary to the public interest; and
      - (B) would not threaten the security of a protected person or the integrity of the witness protection program or other witness protection activities of the commission; and
    - (ii) approves that the hearing be a public hearing; or

- (c) for a hearing other than a hearing mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), the commission may open the hearing to the public if it—
  - (i) considers closing the hearing to the public would be unfair to a person or contrary to the public interest; and
  - (ii) approves that the hearing be a public hearing.
- (3) A decision about whether a hearing should be a public hearing must not be delegated.
- (4) If the commission decides to open a hearing to the public, the presiding officer for the hearing may close the hearing for a particular purpose.

## Western Australia

*Corruption, Crime and Misconduct Act 2003* – section 140

Public examination, when allowed

- (1) This section does not apply to an organised crime examination.
- (2) The Commission may open an examination to the public if, having weighed the benefits of public exposure and public awareness against the potential for prejudice or privacy infringements, it considers that it is in the public interest to do so.
- (3) A decision to open an examination to the public may be made at any time before or during the examination.
- (4) If the Commission decides to open an examination to the public, the Commission may close the examination for a particular purpose.

The question as to whether anti-corruption bodies should be empowered to hold public hearings has proved to be a controversial issue which has been the subject of continuous debate since the introduction of such bodies in Australia.

The issue has been the subject of comment in several reviews of anti-corruption legislation interstate.

An extensive review of the New South Wales Act has been undertaken by a former Chief Justice of the High Court, the Honourable Murray Gleeson AC QC and Bruce McClintock SC, who is now the Inspector of ICAC (NSW)<sup>2</sup>. This review adopted the comments made by Mr McClintock in a report of an earlier review in which he said<sup>3</sup>:

I do not agree, as some have argued, that public hearings are unnecessary or that the power to hold them should be removed. Quite the contrary, in my opinion, public investigations are indispensable to the proper functioning of ICAC. This is not only for the purpose of exposing reasons why findings are made, but also to vindicate the reputations of people, if that is appropriate, who have been damaged by allegations of corruption that have not been substantiated. Moreover, if issues of credibility arise, it is, generally speaking, preferable that those issues are publicly determined.

<sup>2</sup> Murray Gleeson and Bruce McClintock SC, *Independent Panel-Review of the Jurisdiction of the Independent Commission Against Corruption: Report* (30 July 2015).

<sup>3</sup> *Independent Review of the Independent Commission against Corruption Act 1988*, Final Report (2005), 6.5.25).



The authors of the 2015 Review commented on these remarks in their report:

9.4.6 The views expressed [in the McClintock Report] are the views of the current Panel. In particular, the Panel accepts that public inquiries, properly controlled, serve an important role in the disclosure of corrupt conduct. They also have an important role in disclosing the ICAC's investigative processes. The Panel is not attracted to the idea that the powers of the ICAC should all be exercised in private.

The former High Court judge the Hon Ian Callinan AC QC and Professor Nicholas Aroney, conducted a review of the *Crime and Misconduct Act 2001 (Qld)* and reported on 28 March 2013. Their summary of the various State approaches to public hearings is instructive<sup>4</sup>. They stated:

*Public hearings and private examinations*

All the State anticorruption agencies possess wide-ranging inquisitorial powers when investigating allegations of misconduct or corruption, including power to compel witnesses to give evidence on oath and to produce documents, and to do so either in private interviews or public hearings. When first enacted, the New South Wales ICAC Act provided that ICAC hearings would ordinarily be held in public, unless ICAC directed otherwise. Subsequent amendments have enabled ICAC more readily to hold hearings in private, and the frequency of the use of public hearings has declined. Under the current legislative scheme in New South Wales, when deciding whether to proceed by way of private "examination" or "public inquiry", ICAC is now required only to consider whether the use of either of these procedures would be in the public interest, bearing in mind, in the case of public inquiries:

- (a) the benefit of exposing to the public, and making it aware, of corrupt conduct,
- (b) the seriousness of the allegation or complaint being investigated,
- (c) any risk of undue prejudice to a person's reputation (including prejudice that might arise from not holding an inquiry),
- (d) whether the public interest in exposing the matter is outweighed by the public interest in preserving the privacy of the persons concerned.

By contrast, hearings conducted by the CMC<sup>5</sup> are ordinarily (and we think appropriately so) not open to the public unless the CMC decides otherwise and in so deciding in relation to misconduct inquiries the CMC is required to consider whether opening the hearing to the public would be unfair to a person or contrary to the public interest. We note that in 2011-2012, the CMC reported holding investigative hearings over a total of 145 days. During the same period ICAC undertook a total of 10 public inquiries over 70 days of hearings, compared with 135 compulsory examinations over 59 days.

Like the CMC and unlike ICAC hearings undertaken by the Western Australian CCC are ordinarily not open to the public unless, having weighed the benefits of public exposure and public awareness against the potential for prejudice or privacy infringements, the CCC considers it is in the public interest to open the hearing to the public. During 2010-2011, the CCC held a total of 11 hearings of 52 days, four of which were in public over 29 days, seven of which were held in private over 23 days; during 2011-2012, it held a total of seven hearings of 21 days, all of which were held in private.

The IBAC scheme in Victoria has a similar approach to Queensland's and Western

<sup>4</sup> Callinan and Aroney, Report of the Independent Advisory Panel, *Review of the Crime and Misconduct Act and Related Matters*, 28 March 2013 at 66.

<sup>5</sup> Crime and Misconduct Commission Queensland

Australia's. In Victoria, examinations are not to be held in public unless IBAC considers on reasonable grounds:

- (a) there are exceptional circumstances; and
  - (b) it is in the public interest to hold a public examination;
- and
- (c) a public examination can be held without causing unreasonable damage to a person's reputation, safety or wellbeing.

In considering whether or not it is in the public interest to hold a public examination, IBAC may take into account:

- (a) whether the corrupt conduct or the police personnel conduct being investigated is related to an individual and was an isolated incident or systemic in nature;
- (b) the benefit of exposing to the public, and making it aware of, corrupt conduct or police personnel misconduct;
- (c) in the case of police personnel conduct investigations, the seriousness of the matter being investigated.

The panel did not recommend any changes to the Queensland provisions relating to public hearings.

In its submission to the 7th PCMC's (Parliamentary Crime and Misconduct Committee) Review, Queensland the CMC submitted:

The hearings power is an important investigative tool which is used to gather information. The CMC uses its hearings power judiciously and in accordance with appropriate checks and balances. In particular, the power to conduct a hearing in public may only occur in relation to a misconduct investigation and is a decision made by the Commission when satisfied that it is not in the public interest to close the hearing.

## SUBMISSIONS TO THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INQUIRY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL INTEGRITY COMMISSION

The Gilbert Tobin Centre of Public Law at the University of New South Wales in its submission to the Select Committee on the establishment of a National Integrity Commission<sup>6</sup> warned of the problems associated with public hearings into alleged corruption and argued that public hearings are not justified in the ordinary case. However, the submission continued:

An alternative view within our group is that, used prudently and relatively sparingly, public hearings are a valuable tool in exposing for public attention the existence of serious wrongdoing within politics or public administration, and for deterring future conduct of that kind. The conventional criminal justice system carries out the lion's share of this role in society, through trials conducted in public with particular legal safeguards in place for the accused. According to this alternative view, however, we cannot rely exclusively on the conventional court process to address reasonable public

<sup>6</sup> Gilbert Tobin Submission to Select Committee on the establishment of a National Integrity Commission 20 April 2016

expectations about the investigation and exposure of corrupt conduct, and the risks of the public confusing one process for the other are not as high as others suggest. Even within this view, the power to hold public hearings should be statutorily circumscribed to matters where the Commissioner determines it is in the public interest to do so, such as is required by s 31 of the *Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988* (NSW).

The Law Council of Australia also commented on public hearings in its submission to the Select Committee on the establishment of a National Integrity Commission (NIC). The submission argued as follows:<sup>7</sup>

#### Public Hearings

47. One issue to be assessed in deciding whether to establish a standing commission into corruption is whether to empower the commission to conduct public hearings. This decision is not uncontroversial. The NSW ICAC has the power to conduct public hearings, as does Victoria's IBAC; however, not all Australian corruption commissions are so empowered. For example, South Australia's ICAC conducts all examinations in private.
48. The NSW ICAC must consider various factors in determining whether or not it is in the public interest to conduct a public inquiry, including:
  - the benefit of exposing corrupt conduct to the public;
  - the seriousness of the allegation or complaint being investigated;
  - any risk of undue prejudice to a person's reputation (including prejudice that might arise from not holding an inquiry); and
  - whether the public interest in exposing the matter is outweighed by the public interest in preserving the privacy of the persons concerned.
49. Key advantages associated with the conduct of public hearings include transparency, instilling public confidence in dealing with corruption, and deterrence to engaging in corruption.
50. Conversely, public hearings can significantly impact on the rights of individual persons appearing before the ICAC. Appearances before a corruption inquiry may generate substantial media interest, and taint a witness's reputation. These issues might be compounded by factors including:
  - usually only part of an investigation is conducted in public, which may distort the public's understanding of events;
  - persons of interest ordinarily have no right to subpoena witnesses or documents;
  - members of the public may fail to appreciate the distinction between a commission of inquiry, often presided over by a former judge, and a court; and
  - inquiries often involve multiple persons of interest such that decisions whether to conduct hearings in public are made globally and not with the interests of an individual in mind.
51. If the implementation of a NIC includes the power to hold public hearings it is important that there be an appropriate balance between transparency and the

<sup>7</sup> Law Council of Australia submission to the Select Committee on the Establishment of a National Integrity Commission Submission 20 April 2016, 18)

abrogation of rights and reputation of individuals appearing before such a Commission.

52. The Law Council considers that the approach in Queensland which enables the CCC to conduct private hearings should be the default model adopted in proceedings before a federal ACA.

ICAC (NSW) made the following submission to the Select Committee:<sup>8</sup>

Public inquiries are a significant mechanism for exposing truth and encouraging high standards of behaviour in public officials and others. Public inquiries provide transparency in the way in which the Commission operates and promotes public confidence in those operations. They may also result in people with relevant information becoming aware of the Commission's interest in a particular matter and coming forward with that information. A public inquiry may also be used to "clear the air" where public attention has been drawn to significant allegations which, upon investigation, are found to be baseless.

#### DISCUSSION

The New South Wales ICAC has conducted more public hearings than any other Australian anti-corruption body. In part, this has been due to the legislative scheme which previously regulated such hearings. The provisions regulating hearings in New South Wales has been amended on a number of occasions. In the original Act, which came into operation in 1988, section 31 provided that a hearing before the Commission was to be held in public, unless the Commission directed that it be heard in private.

The section was amended by the *Independent Commission Against Corruption (Amendment) Act 1991* to provide that a hearing may be held in public or in private, or partly in public and partly in private, as decided by the Commission. In reaching these decisions, the Commission was obliged to have regard to any matters which it considered to be related to the public interest.

Section 31 in its present form is set out above.

Over the years the number of public hearings in New South Wales and the manner in which they were conducted have attracted considerable criticism. There was particular concern over extensive publicity given to matters in which corruption charges were subsequently laid and the consequent potential impact on the fair trial of persons concerned.

I mention this because in the wake of the publicity given to these hearings it is not difficult to understand why a more conservative approach was taken when drafting the South Australian legislation.

However, in the light of the experience of operating under the legislation in this State, the complete bar on public hearings in all cases has been questioned.

<sup>8</sup> ICAC Submission to the Senate Select Committee on the Establishment of a National Integrity Commission April 2015, 17

It is important to note that the discussion around the advisability or otherwise of public hearings elsewhere has taken place in the context of hearings in relation to corruption. In New South Wales, for example, there is power to conduct public enquiries in relation to corrupt conduct or conduct which is connected with corrupt conduct or liable to encourage corrupt conduct.

By way of contrast, the jurisdiction of ICAC in South Australia, is divided into the categories of corruption in public administration, misconduct in public administration and maladministration in public administration.

In my view, there are good reasons for maintaining the requirement that inquiries into corruption in public administration be held in private. If the evidence collected warrants referral to the Director of Public Prosecutions and a decision is made to launch a prosecution, the facts of the matter will be made public as part of the prosecution process. Nevertheless it is not difficult to appreciate that the often sensational publicity surrounding public hearings can prejudice a subsequent criminal trial.

On the other hand, there may well be investigations into misconduct in public administration or maladministration in public administration which would justify a public hearing of all or some of the evidence.

In the event of the Commissioner being given a discretion to hold hearings in public, one would still expect that the vast majority of examinations would be heard in private.

Unlike investigations into corruption in public administration, it is open to the Commissioner in investigations into maladministration or misconduct in public administration to make findings in relation to public officers and practices. In some cases, it would be appropriate if the process leading to such findings took place at a public hearing. Apart from acknowledging the vested interest of the public in evidence given at such an inquiry and being able to observe the process, the inquiry itself may well benefit by receiving information from the public arising from an informed understanding of what it is that the Commissioner is enquiring into. I am also of the view that a better understanding of the work of the Commissioner and added confidence in the institution would result.

I recommend that the Act be amended so as to provide that the default position in the case of hearings into misconduct or maladministration in public administration, is that they be held in private. However, it is my view that the Commissioner should be given a discretion to hold a hearing or part of a hearing in public.

I think the legislation should set out the grounds upon which the discretion is to be exercised. It is significant that in Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia and now New South Wales the discretion whether to order a public hearing is to be exercised by reference to criteria which is set out in the relevant legislation.

In my view, the Act should specifically address the issue of public hearings in relation to those cases of alleged misconduct or maladministration which the Commissioner decides to investigate himself. I am not in favour of a provision which simply states that the Commissioner is to have the powers of a Royal Commission. I recommend an amendment which would make it clear that in

matters in which there is to be a hearing, the default position is that it is to be in private unless the Commissioner orders a public hearing and that, in making that decision, regard is to be had to matters specified in the legislation. The Victorian legislation provides some guidance for the matters which are relevant for this purpose. They include the requirement that a public hearing should only be held in exceptional circumstances where it is in the interests of the public to hold a public examination and where such an examination can be held without unreasonable damage to a person's reputation

## EDUCATION AND PREVENTION

Section 3 (1) (a) (ii) provides that one of the primary objects of the Act is –

the prevention or minimisation of corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration, including through referral of potential issues, education and evaluation of practices, policies and procedures.

A central feature of the requirement to keep the public informed of the existence and operations of ICAC is through the website which the Commissioner is required to maintain. In addition to that, it is common for the Commissioner to provide information through public statements and media releases. There is also a dedicated program of education through information sessions to various groups throughout the community. The statistics relevant to educational activities are set out in the following table:

FACE-TO-FACE EDUCATION SESSIONS				
	2013/2014	2014/2015	2015/2016	2016/2017
	116	96	76	87
<b>Attendees</b>	6,200	4,300	2,900	3,019

## MAKING A DIFFERENCE TO THE PREVENTION OR MINIMISATION OF CORRUPTION, MISCONDUCT AND MALADMINISTRATION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

When conducting the Annual Review of the operations of the Commission and the OPI, the reviewer is required to consider whether the operations made an appreciable difference to the prevention or minimisation of corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration. The nature of this assessment has been discussed from time to time at the hearings of the Parliamentary Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee of the Parliament of South Australia.

In my Annual Report for the period 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017, I suggested a possible approach as follows:

In order to address this issue, it is appropriate to return to the primary objects of the Act as set out in section 3 (1), namely,

"the identification and investigation of corruption in public administration and the prevention or minimisation of corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration, including through referral of potential issues, education and evaluation of practices, policies and procedures".

These stated aims highlight the fact that ICAC is not a prosecuting authority but rather performs an investigative role in relation to corruption in order to expose it with the effect of preventing or minimising such activity. There is the further role of preventing or minimising misconduct and maladministration in public administration. This latter function is to be achieved through referral, education and evaluation of practices, policies and procedures.

It follows that the effectiveness of ICAC is not to be measured in terms of convictions in relation to charges which might later be brought by the DPP or other prosecuting authority.

This was the point made by the Hon Murray Gleeson AC and Bruce McClintock SC in their report on ICAC (NSW)<sup>9</sup> when they quoted with approval an earlier report<sup>10</sup> which stated:

The number of criminal prosecutions is, however, an imperfect indicator of the performance of ICAC. The principal function of ICAC is to investigate and expose corrupt conduct, not to obtain criminal convictions. ICAC was established because of the difficulties with obtaining criminal convictions for corruption offences. Its focus generally will, and should be, on those matters where it is more important to ascertain what happened than to obtain a criminal conviction.

The Select Committee on the Establishment of a National Integrity Commission makes the following comments<sup>11</sup>:

3.91 The expenditure of public money always requires justification. Any expansion of public services should be accompanied by expectations and measures of success. In a polity with no corruption, there would be no need to take any anti-corruption measures. In the absence of anti-corruption measures it is doubtful that any corruption would be uncovered, creating the impression of there being no corruption; even if this is only because there is no-one looking.

3.92 Careful thought needs to be given to measuring success in the case of an anticorruption agency. An anti-corruption agency that uncovers no corruption may be any of; extremely successful, incompetent, severely under resourced, or operating in a corruption free environment. The response to this problem in Australia has typically been to rely on qualitative measures of trust in government and perceptions of corruption. As the former NSW Premier Nick Greiner argued:

...it would also be crass and naïve to measure the success of the independent commission by how many convictions it gets or how much corruption it uncovers. The simple fact is that the measure of its success will be the enhancement of integrity and, most importantly, of community confidence in public administration in this State.

<sup>9</sup> *Independent Panel-Review of the Jurisdiction of the Independent Commission Against Corruption*, 30 July 2015, 75.

<sup>10</sup> Bruce McClintock, *Independent Review of the Independent Commission Against Corruption Act 1988, Final Report* (2005) 3.4.22.

<sup>11</sup> *Select Committee Interim Report* (May 2016).

The difficulties inherent in determining the impact of ICAC on the type of conduct with which anti-corruption bodies is concerned have been discussed in Annual Reviews and in evidence before the Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee of the Parliament of South Australia.

I have expressed the view that this assessment cannot be made on a strictly quantitative basis. As is stated in the passage quoted above, the tendency is to resort to qualitative material. It is possible to draw inferences from the activities of ICAC. As a result of educative measures and general publicity, ICAC has become reasonably well-known in the community. In particular, its activities would be familiar to most public officers whose conduct it examines. It is open to infer that this education and publicity has resulted in a level of deterrence. To this must be added the number of matters which have been drawn to the attention of ICAC and in respect of which it has taken action of one kind or another.

There is ample evidence from which to infer that the organisation has made a significant impact in preventing corruption, maladministration and misconduct in public administration.

## OPERATIONS OF ICAC

I have reported on various aspects of the operations of ICAC and the OPI in my Annual Reports. The extent of the investigational operations since the commencement of ICAC and the OPI is evident from the following statistics.

COMPLAINTS AND REPORTS				
	2013/2014	2014/2015	2015/2016	2016/2017
<b>Complaints</b>	462	453	463	428
<b>Reports</b>	461	474	600	772
<b>Total</b>	923	927	1,063	1,200
<b>Giving rise to</b>	2,276	1,525	1,693	1,797
	Issues	Issues	Issues	Issues

CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION			
Corruption Matters Referred to SAPOL, Police Ombudsman or another Law Enforcement Agency			
2013/2014	2014/2015	2015/2016	2016/2017
82	74	79	114
Corruption Investigations commenced by ICAC (including joint investigations with SAPOL)			
2013/2014	2014/2015	2015/2016	2016/2017

71	82	32	34
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<b>MISCONDUCT OR MALADMINISTRATION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION</b>			
<b>Matters Referred to Inquiry Agency</b>			
<b>2013/2014</b>	<b>2014/2015</b>	<b>2015/2016</b>	<b>2016/2017</b>
65	89	82	90
<b>Matters Referred to a Public Authority</b>			
<b>2013/2014</b>	<b>2014/2015</b>	<b>2015/2016</b>	<b>2016/2017</b>
52	120	187	347
<b>Matters where Commissioner Exercised Powers of Inquiry Agency</b>			
<b>2013/2014</b>	<b>2014/2015</b>	<b>2015/2016</b>	<b>2016/2017</b>
22	12	2	3

<b>NO FURTHER ACTION TAKEN</b>				
	<b>2013/2014</b>	<b>2014/2015</b>	<b>2015/2016</b>	<b>2016/2017</b>
<b>Complaints</b>	327	342	326	350
<b>Reports</b>	145	186	201	310

As stated in my Annual Reports, it is apparent that the OPI is well administered and efficient. No doubt the volume and difficulty of performing the "shop front" tasks involved has led to some mistakes, but I have not detected any significant problems in this area.

I pay close regard to the exercise of the investigational powers of ICAC and I am satisfied that there is a consciousness of the importance of observing correct procedures and that the system which has been put in place is calculated to instill proper practice in this regard.

The Commissioner keeps a close eye on the task of recommending legislative changes when required and this has resulted in periodic amendments to the Act to ensure that it has the capacity to meet its major purposes.

  
The Hon Kevin Duggan AM QC  
Reviewer of ICAC  
9/6 November 2017

South Australia

## Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012

An Act to establish the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption and the Office for Public Integrity; and for other purposes.

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#### Legislative history

### The Parliament of South Australia enacts as follows:

## Part 1—Preliminary

### 1—Short title

This Act may be cited as the *Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012*.

### 3—Primary objects

- (1) The primary objects of this Act are—
  - (a) to establish the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption with functions designed to further—
    - (i) the identification and investigation of corruption in public administration; and
    - (ii) the prevention or minimisation of corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration, including through referral of potential issues, education and evaluation of practices, policies and procedures; and
  - (b) to establish the Office for Public Integrity to manage complaints about public administration with a view to—
    - (i) the identification of corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration; and
    - (ii) ensuring that complaints about public administration are dealt with by the most appropriate person or body; and
  - (c) to achieve an appropriate balance between the public interest in exposing corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration and the public interest in avoiding undue prejudice to a person's reputation (recognising that the balance may be weighted differently in relation to corruption in public administration as compared to misconduct or maladministration in public administration).
- (2) Whilst any potential issue of corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration may be the subject of a complaint or report under this Act and may be assessed and referred to a relevant body in accordance with this Act, it is intended—
  - (a) that the primary object of the Commissioner be to investigate corruption in public administration; and
  - (b) that matters raising potential issues of misconduct or maladministration in public administration will be referred to an inquiry agency or to a public authority (unless the circumstances set out in section 7(1)(cb) or (cc) apply).

### 4—Interpretation

- (1) In this Act, unless the contrary intention appears—

*Australian Parliament* means—

- (a) the Parliament of this State or any other State of the Commonwealth; or
- (b) the Parliament of the Commonwealth; or



- (c) a Legislative Assembly of a Territory of the Commonwealth;

**Commissioner** means the person holding or acting in the office of the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption;

**complaint about public administration** includes—

- (a) a complaint alleging corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration; and  
(b) any complaint about a public authority or public officer;

**contract work** means work performed by a person as a contractor or as an employee of a contractor or otherwise directly or indirectly on behalf of a contractor;

**contravention** includes failure to comply;

**corruption in public administration**—see section 5;

**disciplinary action** includes any process for termination of employment or dismissal from office;

**document** includes a written record that reproduces in an understandable form information stored by computer, microfilm or other process;

**examiner**—see section 14;

**inquiry agency** means—

- (a) the Ombudsman; or  
(d) a person declared by regulation to be an inquiry agency;

**investigator**—see section 14;

**judicial body** means a court, tribunal, body or person invested by law with judicial or quasi-judicial powers;

**judicial officer** means a person who alone or with others constitutes a judicial body;

**law enforcement agency** means—

- (a) the Australian Crime Commission; or  
(b) the Australian Federal Police; or  
(c) the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity; or  
(d) South Australia Police; or  
(f) the police force of another State or a Territory of the Commonwealth; or  
(g) in relation to New South Wales—the Crime Commission, the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Inspector of the Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Police Integrity Commission or the Inspector of the Police Integrity Commission; or  
(h) in relation to Queensland—the Crime and Corruption Commission; or  
(i) in relation to Tasmania—the Integrity Commission; or  
(j) in relation to Victoria—the Office of Police Integrity, the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission or the Independent Broad-based Anti-corruption Commission Committee; or

- (k) in relation to Western Australia—the Corruption and Crime Commission or the Parliamentary Inspector of the Corruption and Crime Commission; or

- (l) a Royal Commission of the Commonwealth, the State or another State or a Territory of the Commonwealth; or

- (m) a person or body declared by regulation to be a law enforcement agency;

**local government body** means a council or a subsidiary of a council established under the *Local Government Act 1999*;

**maladministration in public administration**—see section 5;

**Minister responsible for a public authority**—see Schedule 1;

**Minister responsible for an inquiry agency** means the Minister responsible for administration of the Act under which the agency is constituted or, if some other Minister is declared by regulation to be responsible for the agency, that Minister;

**misconduct in public administration**—see section 5;

**Office** means the Office for Public Integrity;

**personal details** of a person means—

- (a) the person's full name; and  
(b) the person's date of birth; and  
(c) the address of where the person is living; and  
(d) the address of where the person usually lives; and  
(e) the person's business address;

**prescribed offence** means corruption in public administration or an offence against this Act;

**public administration**—without limiting the acts that may comprise public administration, an administrative act within the meaning of the *Ombudsman Act 1972* will be taken to be carried out in the course of public administration;

**public authority**—see Schedule 1;

**public officer**—see Schedule 1;

**public sector agency** has the same meaning as in the *Public Sector Act 2009*;

**public sector employee** has the same meaning as in the *Public Sector Act 2009*;

**publish** means publish by—

- (a) newspaper, radio or television; or  
(b) internet or other electronic means of creating and sharing content with the public or participating in social networking with the public; or  
(c) any similar means of communication to the public;

*seconded*—a police officer or special constable is seconded to assist the Commissioner for the purposes of this Act if the police officer or special constable is employed in accordance with an arrangement whereby the police officer or special constable is granted leave without pay in relation to his or her appointment under the *Police Act 1998* for the purpose of being engaged as an employee under section 12 of this Act;

*statement of information*—see section 28;

*vehicle* means a vehicle, vessel or aircraft and includes a caravan, trailer and anything attached to a vehicle.

- (2) For the purposes of this Act, misconduct or maladministration in public administration will be taken to be *serious or systemic* if the misconduct or maladministration—
- (a) is of such a significant nature that it would undermine public confidence in the relevant public authority, or in public administration generally; and
  - (b) has significant implications for the relevant public authority or for public administration generally (rather than just for the individual public officer concerned).

## 5—Corruption, misconduct and maladministration

- (1) *Corruption in public administration* means conduct that constitutes—
- (a) an offence against Part 7 Division 4 (Offences relating to public officers) of the *Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935*, which includes the following offences:
    - (i) bribery or corruption of public officers;
    - (ii) threats or reprisals against public officers;
    - (iii) abuse of public office;
    - (iv) demanding or requiring benefit on basis of public office;
    - (v) offences relating to appointment to public office; or
  - (b) an offence against the *Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995* or the *Public Corporations Act 1993*, or an attempt to commit such an offence; or
  - (ba) an offence against the *Lobbyists Act 2015*, or an attempt to commit such an offence; or
  - (c) any other offence (including an offence against Part 5 (Offences of dishonesty) of the *Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935*) committed by a public officer while acting in his or her capacity as a public officer or by a former public officer and related to his or her former capacity as a public officer, or by a person before becoming a public officer and related to his or her capacity as a public officer, or an attempt to commit such an offence; or
  - (d) any of the following in relation to an offence referred to in a preceding paragraph:
    - (i) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of the offence;

- (ii) inducing, whether by threats or promises or otherwise, the commission of the offence;
  - (iii) being in any way, directly or indirectly, knowingly concerned in, or party to, the commission of the offence;
  - (iv) conspiring with others to effect the commission of the offence.
- (2) If the Commissioner suspects that an offence that is not corruption in public administration (an *incidental offence*) may be directly or indirectly connected with, or may be a part of, a course of activity involving the commission of corruption in public administration (whether or not the Commissioner has identified the nature of that corruption), then the incidental offence is, for so long only as the Commissioner so suspects, taken for the purposes of this Act to be corruption in public administration.
- (3) *Misconduct in public administration* means—
- (a) contravention of a code of conduct by a public officer while acting in his or her capacity as a public officer that constitutes a ground for disciplinary action against the officer; or
  - (b) other misconduct of a public officer while acting in his or her capacity as a public officer.
- (4) *Maladministration in public administration*—
- (a) means—
    - (i) conduct of a public officer, or a practice, policy or procedure of a public authority, that results in an irregular and unauthorised use of public money or substantial mismanagement of public resources; or
    - (ii) conduct of a public officer involving substantial mismanagement in or in relation to the performance of official functions; and
  - (b) includes conduct resulting from impropriety, incompetence or negligence; and
  - (c) is to be assessed having regard to relevant statutory provisions and administrative instructions and directions.
- (5) Without limiting or extending the conduct that may comprise corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration, this Act applies to conduct that—
- (a) occurred before the commencement of this Act; or
  - (b) occurs outside this State; or
  - (c) comprises a failure to act; or
  - (d) is conduct of a person who was a public officer at the time of its occurrence but who has since ceased to be a public officer; or
  - (e) is conduct of a person who was not a public officer at the time of its occurrence but who has since become a public officer.
- (6) A reference in subsection (3) to a code of conduct does not include any statement of principles applicable in relation to the conduct of members of Parliament.

## 6—Parliamentary privilege unaffected

Nothing in this Act affects the privileges, immunities or powers of the Legislative Council or House of Assembly or their committees or members.

## Part 2—Independent Commissioner Against Corruption

### 7—Functions

- (1) There is to be an Independent Commissioner Against Corruption with the following functions:
  - (a) to identify corruption in public administration and to—
    - (i) investigate and refer it for prosecution; or
    - (ii) refer it to a law enforcement agency for investigation and prosecution;
  - (b) to assist inquiry agencies and public authorities to identify and deal with misconduct and maladministration in public administration;
  - (c) to refer complaints and reports to inquiry agencies, public authorities and public officers and to give directions or guidance to public authorities in dealing with misconduct and maladministration in public administration, as the Commissioner considers appropriate;
  - (ca) to identify serious or systemic misconduct or maladministration in public administration;
  - (cb) to exercise the powers of an inquiry agency in dealing with serious or systemic maladministration in public administration if satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so;
  - (cc) to exercise the powers of an inquiry agency in dealing with serious or systemic misconduct in public administration if the Commissioner is satisfied that the matter must be dealt with in connection with a matter the subject of an investigation of a kind referred to in paragraph (a)(i) or a matter being dealt with in accordance with paragraph (cb);
  - (d) to evaluate the practices, policies and procedures of inquiry agencies and public authorities with a view to advancing comprehensive and effective systems for preventing or minimising corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration;
  - (e) to conduct or facilitate the conduct of educational programs designed to prevent or minimise corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration;
  - (f) to perform other functions conferred on the Commissioner by this or any other Act.
- (2) The Commissioner is not subject to the direction of any person in relation to any matter, including—
  - (a) the manner in which functions are carried out or powers exercised under this or any other Act; and

- (b) the priority that the Commissioner gives to a particular matter in carrying out functions under this or any other Act.
- (3) The Attorney-General may request the Commissioner to review a legislative scheme related to public administration and to make recommendations to the Attorney-General for the amendment or repeal of the scheme.
- (4) The Commissioner is to perform his or her functions in a manner that—
  - (a) is as open and accountable as is practicable, while recognising, in particular, that—
    - (i) examinations relating to corruption in public administration must be conducted in private; and
    - (ii) other Acts will govern processes connected with how misconduct and maladministration in public administration is dealt with; and
  - (b) deals as expeditiously as is practicable with allegations of corruption in public administration; and
  - (c) as far as is practicable, deals with any allegation against a Member of Parliament or member of a council established under the *Local Government Act 1999* before the expiry of his or her current term of office.
- (5) For the purposes of exercising his or her functions under subsection (1)(d) or (e), or for reviewing a legislative scheme under subsection (3), the Commissioner—
  - (a) may conduct a public inquiry; and
  - (b) may regulate the conduct of the inquiry as the Commissioner thinks fit,  
(and, for the avoidance of doubt, the inquiry will not be a proceeding for the purposes of section 55).

### 8—Commissioner

- (1) The Commissioner is to be appointed by the Governor for a term not exceeding 7 years and on conditions determined by the Governor.
- (2) A person appointed to be the Commissioner is, at the end of a term of appointment, eligible for reappointment but cannot hold office for terms (including any term as Deputy Commissioner or Acting Commissioner) that exceed 10 years in total.
- (3) A person is only eligible for appointment as the Commissioner if the person—
  - (a) is a legal practitioner of at least 7 years standing (taking into account, for that purpose, periods of legal practice and judicial service within and outside the State) or a former judge of the High Court of Australia, the Federal Court of Australia or the Supreme Court or any other court of a State or Territory of the Commonwealth; and
  - (b) is not a judicial officer or member of an Australian Parliament.
- (4) Before a person is appointed to be the Commissioner, the Attorney-General must ensure that the position is advertised in a newspaper or newspapers circulating in each State and Territory.

- (5) A person may only be appointed to be the Commissioner if, following referral by the Attorney-General of the proposed appointment to the Statutory Officers Committee established under the *Parliamentary Committees Act 1991*—
  - (a) the appointment has been approved by the Committee; or
  - (b) the Committee has not, within 7 days of the referral, or such longer period as is allowed by the Attorney-General, notified the Attorney-General in writing that it does not approve the appointment.
- (6) Despite the *Parliamentary Committees Act 1991*, the Statutory Officers Committee must not report on, or publish material in relation to, matters referred to the Committee under subsection (5) except to the extent allowed by the Attorney-General (but this subsection does not derogate from section 151(2) of the *Parliamentary Committees Act 1991*).
- (7) If a person is a judicial officer immediately before being appointed to be the Commissioner—
  - (a) the conditions of the appointment should not be less favourable to the person than the conditions of his or her judicial office (when viewed from an overall perspective); and
  - (b) for the purposes of determining the person's entitlement to recreation leave, sick leave, long service leave or any other kind of leave under this or another Act, the appointment may, at the option of the person, be taken to be a continuation of his or her service as a judicial officer.
- (8) Subject to subsection (8a), the Commissioner must not, without the consent of the Attorney-General, engage in any remunerated employment or undertaking outside official duties.
- (8a) Nothing prevents the Commissioner being appointed as the Judicial Conduct Commissioner under the *Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act 2015*.
- (9) The Governor may, on the address of both Houses of Parliament, remove the Commissioner from office.
- (10) The Governor may suspend the Commissioner from office for—
  - (a) contravention of a condition of appointment; or
  - (b) misconduct; or
  - (c) failure or incapacity to carry out official duties satisfactorily; or
  - (d) failure to provide information to the Attorney-General as required under section 49.
- (11) If the Governor suspends the Commissioner from office, a full statement of the reason for the suspension must be laid before both Houses of Parliament within 7 days after the suspension if Parliament is then in session or, if not, within 7 days after the commencement of the next session of Parliament.
- (12) If, at the end of 20 sitting days after the statement is laid before Parliament, neither House of Parliament has presented an address to the Governor requiring the Commissioner to be restored to office, the Commissioner is removed from office.

- (13) If within 20 sitting days after the statement is laid before Parliament either House of Parliament presents an address to the Governor requiring the Commissioner to be restored to office, the Commissioner is restored to office.
- (14) The office of Commissioner becomes vacant if the holder—
  - (a) dies; or
  - (b) completes a term of office and is not reappointed; or
  - (c) resigns by written notice to the Governor; or
  - (d) is appointed to judicial office; or
  - (e) is nominated for election as a member of an Australian Parliament; or
  - (f) becomes an insolvent under administration within the meaning of the *Corporations Act 2001* of the Commonwealth; or
  - (g) is convicted of—
    - (i) an indictable offence against the law of this State; or
    - (ii) an offence against the law of this State that is punishable by imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months; or
    - (iii) an offence against the law of another jurisdiction that, if committed in this State, would be an offence of a kind referred to in a preceding paragraph; or
  - (h) is sentenced to imprisonment for an offence (whether against a law of this State or another jurisdiction); or
  - (i) is removed from office by the Governor under this section.
- (15) Except as is provided by this section, the Commissioner may not be removed or suspended from office, nor will the office of the Commissioner become vacant.
- (16) The Commissioner is a senior official for the purposes of the *Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995*.

## 9—Deputy Commissioner

- (1) There is to be a Deputy Commissioner responsible for assisting the Commissioner as directed by the Commissioner.
- (2) The Deputy Commissioner is to be appointed by the Governor for a term not exceeding 7 years and on conditions determined by the Governor.
- (3) A person appointed to be the Deputy Commissioner is, at the end of a term of appointment, eligible for reappointment but cannot hold office for terms (including any term as Commissioner or Acting Commissioner) that exceed 10 years in total.
- (4) A person is only eligible for appointment as the Deputy Commissioner if the person—
  - (a) is a legal practitioner of at least 7 years standing (taking into account, for that purpose, periods of legal practice and judicial service within and outside the State) or a former judge of the High Court of Australia, the Federal Court of Australia or the Supreme Court or any other court of a State or Territory of the Commonwealth; and
  - (b) is not a judicial officer or member of an Australian Parliament.

- (5) The Deputy Commissioner must not, without the consent of the Attorney-General, engage in any remunerated employment or undertaking outside official duties.
- (6) The Deputy Commissioner may—
  - (a) act as the Commissioner during any period for which—
    - (i) no person is for the time being appointed as the Commissioner; or
    - (ii) the Commissioner is absent from, or unable to discharge, official duties; and
  - (b) when not so acting, perform functions or exercise powers at the direction of the Commissioner.
- (7) The Governor may remove the Deputy Commissioner from office for—
  - (a) contravention of a condition of appointment; or
  - (b) misconduct; or
  - (c) failure or incapacity to carry out official duties satisfactorily.
- (8) The office of Deputy Commissioner becomes vacant if the holder—
  - (a) dies; or
  - (b) completes a term of office and is not reappointed; or
  - (c) resigns by written notice to the Governor; or
  - (d) is appointed to judicial office; or
  - (e) is nominated for election as a member of an Australian Parliament; or
  - (f) becomes an insolvent under administration within the meaning of the *Corporations Act 2001* of the Commonwealth; or
  - (g) is convicted of—
    - (i) an indictable offence against the law of this State; or
    - (ii) an offence against the law of this State that is punishable by imprisonment for a term of at least 12 months; or
    - (iii) an offence against the law of another jurisdiction that, if committed in this State, would be an offence of a kind referred to in a preceding paragraph; or
  - (h) is sentenced to imprisonment for an offence (whether against a law of this State or another jurisdiction); or
  - (i) is removed from office by the Governor under subsection (7).
- (9) Except as is provided by this section, the Deputy Commissioner may not be removed from office, nor will the office of the Deputy Commissioner become vacant.
- (10) The Deputy Commissioner is a senior official for the purposes of the *Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995*.

## 10—Pension rights

- (1) The Governor may, by instrument in writing made at the time a person is appointed to be the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner, apply the *Judges' Pensions Act 1971* to or in relation to the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner as if the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner were a Judge as defined in that Act and service as the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner were judicial service as defined in that Act.
- (2) The instrument may—
  - (a) impose conditions on the application of the *Judges' Pensions Act 1971* (including a condition that the Act will only apply if the person is made a Judge following his or her term of office as Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner); and
  - (b) apply the *Judges' Pensions Act 1971* subject to any modifications specified in the instrument.
- (3) Unless the Governor otherwise directs, no pension is to be payable under the *Judges' Pensions Act 1971* if the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner vacates the office due to insolvency or conviction or sentencing for an offence or is removed from office.
- (4) If a person who is or has been the Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner is appointed as a Judge as defined in the *Judges' Pensions Act 1971* and was, immediately before being so appointed, in receipt of a pension under that Act, that pension ceases on the appointment.

## 11—Acting Commissioner

- (1) The Governor may appoint a person (who may be a Public Service employee) to act as the Commissioner during any period for which—
  - (a) no person is for the time being appointed as the Commissioner or the Commissioner is absent from, or unable to discharge, official duties; and
  - (b) no person is for the time being appointed as the Deputy or the Deputy is absent from, or unable to discharge, official duties.
- (2) The terms and conditions of appointment are to be determined by the Governor, except that the person may not act as the Commissioner for more than 6 months in aggregate in any period of 12 months.
- (3) A person appointed to act as the Commissioner is a senior official for the purposes of the *Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995*.

## 12—Employees

- (1) The Commissioner may engage employees on terms and conditions determined by the Commissioner.
- (2) The employees are not Public Service employees but are to be taken to be public sector employees, employed by the Commissioner, for the purposes of the *Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995* and section 74 of the *Public Sector Act 2009*.

### 13—Use of services or staff of other government entities

- (1) The Commissioner may, under an arrangement established by the Minister administering an administrative unit of the Public Service, make use of the services or staff of that administrative unit.
- (2) The Commissioner may, under an arrangement established by the Commissioner of Police, make use of members of South Australia Police, special constables or the services of South Australia Police.
- (3) The Commissioner may, under an arrangement established by the Director of Public Prosecutions, make use of the services or staff of the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

### 14—Examiners and investigators

- (1) The Commissioner may appoint suitable persons to be examiners or investigators for the purposes of this Act.
- (2) An appointment may be made subject to conditions specified in the instrument of appointment.
- (3) The Commissioner may, at any time, revoke an appointment of a person or vary or revoke a condition of appointment or impose a further condition of appointment.
- (4) A police officer or special constable seconded to assist the Commissioner is an investigator.
- (4a) Unless otherwise agreed, by instrument in writing, between the Commissioner and the Commissioner of Police, a police officer or special constable seconded to assist the Commissioner may continue to exercise all powers and authorities vested in the person by or under the *Police Act 1998*, or another Act or law, as a member of South Australia Police or constable in the exercise of functions and powers under this Act during the period of secondment (and section 67(3) of the *Police Act 1998* does not apply in relation to the secondment).
- (5) An investigator who is not a police officer or special constable must be issued with an identity card—
  - (a) containing the person's name and a photograph of the person; and
  - (b) stating that the person is an investigator under this Act.
- (6) If the powers of an investigator have been limited by conditions, the identity card issued to the investigator must indicate those limitations.
- (7) An investigator must, at the request of a person in relation to whom the investigator intends to exercise powers under this Act, produce for the inspection of the person—
  - (a) in the case of an investigator who is a police officer or special constable and is not in uniform—an official card, document or badge identifying the person as a police officer or special constable; or
  - (b) in the case of an investigator appointed under this Act—his or her identity card.

### 15—Cooperation with law enforcement agencies

The Commissioner is to cooperate with other law enforcement agencies insofar as that is consistent with the proper conduct of the Commissioner's functions.

### 16—Delegation

- (1) Subject to subsection (1a), the Commissioner may delegate to a person (including a person for the time being performing particular duties or holding or acting in a specified position) a function or power under this or any other Act.
- (1a) The Commissioner—
  - (a) may only delegate a function or power under section 31 to an examiner; and
  - (b) may not delegate a prescribed function or power.
- (2) A function or power delegated under this section may, if the instrument of delegation so provides, be further delegated.
- (3) A delegation—
  - (a) must be by instrument in writing; and
  - (b) may be absolute or conditional; and
  - (c) does not derogate from the power of the delegator to act in a matter; and
  - (d) is revocable at will.

## Part 3—Office for Public Integrity

### 17—Functions and objectives

There is to be an Office for Public Integrity with the following functions:

- (a) to receive and assess complaints about public administration from members of the public;
- (b) to receive and assess reports about corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration from inquiry agencies, public authorities and public officers;
- (c) to refer complaints and reports to inquiry agencies, public authorities and public officers in circumstances approved by the Commissioner or make recommendations to the Commissioner in relation to complaints and reports;
- (ca) to give directions or guidance to public authorities in circumstances approved by the Commissioner;
- (d) to perform other functions assigned to the Office by the Commissioner or another Act.

### 18—Organisational structure

- (1) The Office is responsible to the Commissioner for the performance of its functions.
- (2) The Commissioner is not bound by the recommendations of the Office.

- (3) The Office is to be comprised of—
- (a) Public Service employees assigned to the Office to assist the Commissioner; and
  - (b) employees of the Commissioner assigned to the Office by the Commissioner.
- (4) While a Public Service employee is assigned to the Office, directions given to the employee by the Commissioner prevail over directions given to the employee by the chief executive of the administrative unit of the Public Service in which the employee is employed to the extent of any inconsistency.
- (5) Where this or any other Act confers a power on the Office or requires that the Office perform any function (including requiring that the Office make a determination, or form an opinion, as to any matter)—
- (a) the power or function may only be exercised or performed by a person who is authorised to do so on behalf of the Office by the Commissioner; and
  - (b) the exercise of that power or the performance of that function by a person so authorised will be taken to be the exercise of that power or the performance of that function by the Office.

## Part 4—Procedures and powers

### Division 1—Complaints and reports

#### 19—Complaints system

A system for the receipt of complaints about public administration is to be established for the Office.

#### 20—Reporting system

- (1) The Commissioner must prepare directions and guidelines governing reporting to the Office of matters that an inquiry agency, public authority or public officer reasonably suspects involves corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration.
- (2) The directions and guidelines—
- (a) must include provisions specifying the matters required to be reported and guidance as to how they should be reported; and
  - (b) may require matters to be reported even if the matter has been referred to the inquiry agency, public authority or public officer under another Act; and
  - (c) must be made available free of charge on the Internet, and at premises established for the receipt of complaints or reports by the Office, for inspection by members of the public.
- (3) An inquiry agency, public authority or public officer—
- (a) must make reports to the Office in accordance with the directions; and
  - (b) may report to the Office any matter that the agency, authority or officer reasonably suspects involves corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration.

- (4) The Attorney-General may, in any event, report such matters to the Commissioner for consideration as the Attorney-General considers appropriate.

#### 21—Obstruction of complaint or report

A person must not—

- (a) prevent another person from making a complaint or report under this Act about a matter that may involve corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration; or
- (b) hinder or obstruct another person in making such a complaint or report.

Maximum penalty: \$10 000 or imprisonment for 2 years.

#### 22—False or misleading statements in complaint or report etc

A person must not—

- (a) make a statement knowing that it is false or misleading in a material particular (whether by reason of the inclusion or omission of a particular) in information provided in a complaint or report; or
- (b) make a complaint or report knowing that there are no grounds for the making of the complaint or report.

Maximum penalty: \$10 000 or imprisonment for 2 years.

### Division 2—Assessments, investigations and referrals

#### Subdivision 1—Assessment and action that may be taken

#### 23—Assessment

- (1) On receipt by the Office of a complaint or report, the matter must be assessed as to whether—
- (a) it raises a potential issue of corruption in public administration that could be the subject of a prosecution; or
  - (b) it raises a potential issue of misconduct or maladministration in public administration; or
  - (c) it raises some other issue that should be referred to an inquiry agency, public authority or public officer; or
  - (d) it is trivial, vexatious or frivolous, it has previously been dealt with by an inquiry agency or public authority and there is no reason to reexamine it or there is other good reason why no action should be taken in respect of it,
- and a determination made as to whether or not action should be taken to refer the matter or to make recommendations to the Commissioner.
- (2) The Commissioner may also assess, or require the Office to assess, according to the criteria set out in subsection (1), any other matter identified by the Commissioner acting on his or her own initiative or by the Commissioner or the Office in the course of performing functions under this or any other Act.



- (3) The Office or the Commissioner may, for the purpose of assessing a matter, by written notice, require an inquiry agency, public authority or public officer to produce a written statement of information about a specified matter, or to answer specified questions, within a specified period and in a specified form, verified if the written notice so requires by statutory declaration.
- (4) A person must not refuse or fail to comply with a requirement of a notice under subsection (3).  
Maximum penalty: \$10 000 or imprisonment for 2 years.

#### 24—Action that may be taken

- (1) If a matter is assessed as raising a potential issue of corruption in public administration that could be the subject of a prosecution, the matter must be—
  - (a) investigated by the Commissioner; or
  - (b) referred to South Australia Police or other law enforcement agency.
- (2) If a matter is assessed as raising a potential issue of misconduct or maladministration in public administration, the matter must be dealt with in 1 or more of the following ways:
  - (a) the matter may be referred to an inquiry agency;
  - (b) in the case of a matter raising potential issues of serious or systemic maladministration in public administration—the Commissioner may exercise the powers of an inquiry agency in dealing with the matter if satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so;
  - (c) in the case of a matter raising potential issues of serious or systemic misconduct in public administration—the Commissioner may exercise the powers of an inquiry agency in dealing with the matter if the Commissioner is satisfied that the matter must be dealt with in connection with a matter the subject of an investigation of a kind referred to in subsection (1)(a) or a matter being dealt with in accordance with paragraph (b);
  - (d) the matter may be referred to a public authority and directions or guidance may be given to the authority in respect of the matter.
- (3) If a matter is assessed as raising other issues that should be dealt with by an inquiry agency, public authority or public officer, the matter must be referred, or the complainant or reporting agency advised to refer the matter, to the agency, authority or officer.
- (4) If a matter is assessed as trivial, vexatious or frivolous, the matter has previously been dealt with by an inquiry agency or public authority and there is no reason to reexamine the matter or there is other good reason why no action should be taken in respect of the matter, no action need be taken in respect of the matter.
- (5) The same matter, or different aspects of the same matter, may be dealt with contemporaneously under more than 1 subsection.

##### Example—

A matter that is assessed as raising a potential issue of corruption in public administration that could be the subject of a prosecution and a potential issue of misconduct or maladministration in public administration may be dealt with under both subsection (1) and subsection (2).

- (6) A matter may be dealt with under this section even if it is a matter referred to an inquiry agency or public authority under another Act.
- (7) The making of an assessment, and whether action is taken, and what action is taken, in respect of a matter is at the absolute discretion of the Commissioner and, if an assessment is modified in the course of dealing with the matter, the Commissioner may deal with the matter according to the modified assessment.
- (8) Subject to any directions of the Commissioner, reasonable steps must be taken to ensure that a complainant or reporting agency receives an acknowledgement of the complaint or report and is informed as to the action, if any, taken in respect of the matter.

#### 25—Public statements

The Commissioner may make a public statement in connection with a particular matter if, in the Commissioner's opinion, it is appropriate to do so in the public interest, having regard to the following:

- (a) the benefits to an investigation or consideration of a matter under this Act that might be derived from making the statement;
- (b) the risk of prejudicing the reputation of a person by making the statement;
- (c) whether the statement is necessary in order to allay public concern or to prevent or minimise the risk of prejudice to the reputation of a person;
- (d) if an allegation against a person has been made public and, in the opinion of the Commissioner following an investigation or consideration of a matter under this Act, the person is not implicated in corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration—whether the statement would redress prejudice caused to the reputation of the person as a result of the allegation having been made public;
- (e) the risk of adversely affecting a potential prosecution;
- (f) whether any person has requested that the Commissioner make the statement.

#### Subdivision 2—Action in relation to corruption

##### 26—Standard operating procedures

- (1) The Commissioner must prepare standard operating procedures governing the exercise of powers by investigators for the purposes of an investigation into corruption in public administration.
- (2) The standard operating procedures must—
  - (a) include provisions designed to ensure that persons in relation to whom powers are to be exercised under this Act are provided with appropriate information about their rights, obligations and liabilities under this Act; and
  - (b) be made available free of charge on the Internet, and at premises established for the receipt of complaints or reports by the Office, for inspection by members of the public.

- (3) Contravention of the operating procedures constitutes a ground for suspending, dismissing or taking other disciplinary action against the investigator (but the validity of the exercise of a power cannot be questioned on the ground of contravention of the operating procedures).

#### 27—Management of investigation

- (1) If the Commissioner decides to investigate a potential issue of corruption in public administration, the Commissioner must oversee the investigation.
- (2) The Commissioner—
- (a) may determine to head the investigation himself or herself or appoint the Deputy Commissioner or an examiner to head the investigation and report to the Commissioner; and
  - (b) may appoint 1 or more legal practitioners to assist as counsel in relation to the investigation.

#### 28—Production of statement of information

For the purposes of an investigation into corruption in public administration, the person heading the investigation may, by written notice, require an inquiry agency, public authority or public officer to produce a written statement of information about a specified matter, or to answer specified questions, within a specified period and in a specified form, verified if the person so requires by statutory declaration.

#### 29—Examination and production of documents and other things

- (1) An examination may be conducted for the purposes of an investigation into corruption in public administration as set out in Schedule 2.
- (2) A person may be required to produce a document or thing for the purposes of an investigation into corruption in public administration as set out in Schedule 2.

#### 29A—Power to authorise inspection of financial records etc

- (1) For the purposes of an investigation into corruption in public administration, the Commissioner may, by written notice, authorise an investigator to inspect and take copies of financial records.
- (2) A copy of an authorisation under this section must be served on the relevant deposit holder not less than 3 clear days before the inspection is to occur, unless the Commissioner otherwise directs.
- (3) An investigator may, for the purpose of inspecting and taking copies of financial records in accordance with an authorisation under this section, give directions to, or impose requirements on, the deposit holder or an officer or employee of the deposit holder.
- (4) In this section—
- deposit holder* means—
- (a) an ADI; or
  - (b) a friendly society; or
  - (c) a person or an organisation that holds money in accounts on behalf of other persons; or

- (d) a person who carries on business as a pawnbroker; or
- (e) an institution of a kind declared by regulation to be a deposit holder;

*financial records* means any of the following in the possession or control of a deposit holder:

- (a) books of account, accounts, and accounting records (including working papers and other documents necessary to explain the methods and calculations by which accounts are made up);
  - (b) books, diaries, or other records used in the course of carrying on the business of a deposit holder;
  - (c) cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes, deposit slips, orders for the payment of money, invoices, receipts and vouchers;
  - (d) securities, and documents of title to securities,
- and includes such records kept in electronic form.

#### 30—Power to require person to disclose identity

For the purposes of an investigation into corruption in public administration, an investigator may require a person who the investigator reasonably suspects has committed, is committing, or is about to commit, a prescribed offence, or may be able to assist an investigation of a prescribed offence, to state all or any of the person's personal details and to produce evidence of those details.

#### 31—Enter and search powers under warrant

- (1) The Commissioner may, on application by an investigator or on his or her own initiative, issue a warrant authorising an investigator or a police officer to enter and search—
- (a) a place occupied or used by an inquiry agency, public authority or public officer; or
  - (b) a vehicle owned or used by an inquiry agency, public authority or public officer.
- (2) A judge of the Supreme Court may, on application by an investigator, issue a warrant authorising an investigator or a police officer to enter and search any place or vehicle.
- (3) A warrant may only be issued if the Commissioner or the judge is satisfied that the warrant is reasonably required in the circumstances for the purposes of an investigation into a potential issue of corruption in public administration.
- (4) An application for a warrant may be made personally or, if, in the opinion of the applicant, the warrant is urgently required and there is not enough time to lodge a written application and attend in person, by fax, email or telephone in accordance with practices and procedures prescribed, in the case of an application to the Commissioner, by the regulations and, in the case of an application to a judge of the Supreme Court, by rules of the court.
- (5) The grounds of an application for a warrant must be verified—
- (a) if the application is made to the Commissioner—by statutory declaration; or
  - (b) if the application is made to a judge of the Supreme Court—by affidavit.

- (6) A warrant must—
  - (a) specify the place or vehicle to which the warrant relates; and
  - (b) state whether entry is authorised at any time of the day or night or during specified hours of the day or night.
- (7) A warrant authorises an investigator or a police officer—
  - (a) to enter and search and, if necessary, use reasonable force to break into or open—
    - (i) the place or vehicle to which the warrant relates; or
    - (ii) part of, or anything in or on, a place or vehicle to which the warrant relates; and
  - (b) to give directions with respect to the stopping or movement of a vehicle to which the warrant relates; and
  - (c) in the course of executing the warrant—
    - (i) to take photographs, films or audio, video or other recordings; and
    - (ii) to examine, copy or take extracts from a document connected with the investigation or any other investigation into corruption in public administration; and
    - (iii) to examine or test any thing connected with the investigation or any other investigation into corruption in public administration, or cause or require it to be examined or tested; and
    - (iv) if the investigator or police officer reasonably suspects that a person who is or has been on or in the place or vehicle has on or about his or her body evidence of a prescribed offence, to search the person; and
    - (v) to seize and retain anything that the investigator or police officer reasonably suspects has been used in, or may constitute evidence of, a prescribed offence, or issue a retention order in respect of such a thing requiring that it not be removed or interfered with without the approval of an investigator; and
    - (vi) to seize and retain anything that the investigator or police officer reasonably suspects has been used in, or may constitute evidence of, an offence other than a prescribed offence, or issue a retention order in respect of such a thing requiring that it not be removed or interfered with without the approval of an investigator, if the investigator or police officer reasonably believes that it is necessary to do so in order to prevent its concealment, loss, mutilation or destruction or its use in committing such an offence.
- (8) In executing a warrant, the investigator or police officer may be assisted by such persons as the investigator or police officer considers necessary in the circumstances.
- (9) An investigator or police officer may require an occupier of a place or a person apparently in charge of a document or thing to give to an investigator or police officer, or a person assisting an investigator or police officer, such assistance as is reasonably required by the investigator or police officer for the effective execution of a warrant.

- (10) In searching a person under this section, the investigator or police officer—
  - (a) may run his or her hands over the person's outer clothing; and
  - (b) may require the person to remove a coat, jacket, hat or shoes the person is wearing, and may run his or her hands over the person's remaining outer clothing; and
  - (c) if the investigator or police officer sees or detects any thing that he or she reasonably suspects is, or contains, evidence of a prescribed offence, may require the person to surrender that item for inspection; and
  - (d) may use reasonable force to remove an item from a person if the person does not comply with a requirement to remove or surrender the item under paragraph (b) or (c); and
  - (e) may inspect an item that a person has removed or surrendered, or that has been removed from a person; and
  - (f) must conduct the search in a manner that affords, to the extent that the circumstances of the search permit, reasonable privacy to the person being searched; and
  - (g) must conduct the search as quickly as is reasonably practicable in the circumstances of the search.
- (11) A search must be conducted by a person of the same sex as the person being searched unless it is not reasonable or practicable to do so in the circumstances of the search.
- (12) A warrant, if not executed at the expiration of 1 month from the date of its issue, then expires.
- (13) The Supreme Court may make rules of court providing for the Chief Justice to determine the judge to whom an application is to be made or otherwise regulating practice and procedure for the purposes of this section.
- (14) The provisions set out in Schedule 3 apply in relation to a warrant under this section.

## 32—Seizure and retention order procedures

- (1) A retention order under section 31—
  - (a) must be in the form of a written notice given to the owner or person apparently in control of the thing to which the order relates; and
  - (b) may be varied or discharged by further such written notice.
- (2) If a retention order is issued, a person who, knowing of the order, removes or interferes with the thing to which the order relates without the approval of the Commissioner or an investigator before the thing is dealt with under this section or the retention order discharged is guilty of an offence.  
Maximum penalty: \$5 000.
- (3) Subject to this section, if any thing has been made the subject of a retention order under section 31, the following provisions apply:
  - (a) if proceedings are not instituted for an offence relating to the thing within the designated period after the issuing of the retention order, the retention order is taken to have been discharged on the expiration of the designated period;

- (b) if proceedings for an offence relating to the thing are instituted within the designated period after the issuing of the retention order, the court dealing with the proceedings may order that it be forfeited to the Crown (but if no such order is made, the retention order is taken to have been discharged);
- (c) if the Commissioner or an investigator subsequently determines that the thing should be seized, an investigator may, without warrant, enter and search and, if necessary, use reasonable force to break into or open—
  - (i) the place at which, or vehicle in which, the thing is reasonably suspected to be located; or
  - (ii) part of, or anything in or on, a place at which, or vehicle in which, the thing is reasonably suspected to be located,

and may seize and retain the thing (and section 31(8) and (9) apply to the exercise of such powers as if the powers were being exercised pursuant to a warrant under that section).

- (3a) If any thing has been seized under section 31 or under subsection (3)(c), the following provisions apply:
  - (a) the thing must be held pending proceedings for an offence relating to the thing seized, unless the Commissioner, on application, authorises its release to the person from whom it was seized, or to a person who had legal title to it at the time of its seizure, subject to such conditions as the Commissioner thinks fit;
  - (b) if proceedings for an offence relating to the thing are instituted, the court dealing with the proceedings may order—
    - (i) that it be forfeited to the Crown; or
    - (ii) that a person to whom it was released under paragraph (a) or the defendant pay to the Attorney-General an amount equal to its market value at the time of its seizure as the court thinks fit; or
    - (iii) that it be released to any person.

- (4) In this section—

*designated period* means 2 years or such longer period as a judge of the Supreme Court may, on application by the Commissioner, allow.

### 33—Obstruction

- (1) A person must not—
  - (a) refuse or fail to provide a statement of information as required by the person heading an investigation; or
  - (b) include information in a statement of information knowing that it is false or misleading in a material particular; or
  - (c) without lawful excuse, refuse or fail to comply with a requirement or direction of an investigator under this Act; or
  - (d) alter, destroy, conceal or fabricate a document or other thing knowing that it is or is likely to be required by an investigator performing functions under this Act; or

- (e) otherwise hinder or obstruct an investigator, or a person assisting an investigator, in the performance of his or her functions.

Maximum penalty: \$10 000 or imprisonment for 2 years.

- (2) An investigator may arrest a person without warrant if the investigator reasonably suspects that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit, an offence against subsection (1) and—
  - (a) when required to do so by an investigator the person failed to state truthfully his or her personal details or to produce true evidence of those details; or
  - (b) the investigator has reasonable grounds for believing that the person would, if not arrested—
    - (i) fail to attend court in answer to a summons issued in respect of the offence; or
    - (ii) continue the offence or repeat the offence; or
    - (iii) alter, destroy, conceal or fabricate evidence relating to the offence; or
    - (iv) intimidate, harass, threaten or interfere with a person who may provide or produce evidence of the offence.
- (3) On arresting a person under this section, the investigator must immediately deliver the person, or cause the person to be delivered, into the custody of a police officer (and the person will, for the purposes of any other law, then be taken to have been apprehended by the police officer without warrant).

### 34—Limiting action by other agencies and authorities

- (1) The Commissioner may, by written notice, require a South Australian law enforcement agency, inquiry agency or public authority to refrain from taking action, in respect of a particular matter being investigated by the Commissioner under this Act or to conduct a joint investigation with the Commissioner in respect of a particular matter (and the agency or authority must comply with the requirement even if the agency or authority is otherwise required or authorised to take action under another Act).
- (2) The notice must specify the period for which it is to apply and set out details of the action that is not to be taken or the requirements governing any joint investigation.
- (3) The Commissioner must consider any comments of the agency or authority with respect to the terms of the notice.

### 35—Injunction to refrain from conduct pending investigation

- (1) The Supreme Court may, on application made by the Commissioner (in a case where section 34 does not apply or the Commissioner does not consider it appropriate to issue a notice under that section), grant an injunction restraining a person from engaging in conduct that is the subject of, or affects the subject matter of, an investigation or proposed investigation by the Commissioner.
- (2) The Supreme Court must not grant an injunction under this section unless it is satisfied—
  - (a) that the conduct sought to be restrained is likely to impede the investigation or proposed investigation; or

- (b) that it is necessary in the public interest to do so.

### 36—Prosecutions and disciplinary action

- (1) On completing an investigation or at any time during an investigation (whether relating to a potential issue of corruption in public administration or of misconduct or maladministration in public administration), the Commissioner may do either or both of the following:
  - (a) refer a matter to the relevant law enforcement agency for further investigation and potential prosecution;
  - (b) refer a matter to a public authority for further investigation and potential disciplinary action against a public officer for whom the authority is responsible.
- (2) The Commissioner may disclose to the relevant law enforcement agency or public authority any evidence or information that the Commissioner has in respect of the matter.
- (3) The Commissioner need not obtain the views of a public authority before referring a matter under this section.
- (4) If a matter is referred to a public authority under subsection (1)(b), the Commissioner may give directions or guidance to the authority, which may include (without limitation)—
  - (a) a requirement that the authority submit a report or reports on action taken in respect of the matter as set out in the directions; and
  - (b) a recommendation as to the action that should be taken by the authority and the period within which it should be taken.
- (5) The Commissioner may not give directions to the Governor or a judicial officer or to the Attorney-General in relation to a matter concerning the Governor or a judicial officer.
- (6) The Commissioner may not give directions to a House of Parliament or the Joint Parliamentary Service Committee in relation to a matter concerning a public officer.
- (7) The Commissioner may at any time—
  - (a) revoke a referral to a public authority; or
  - (b) revoke or vary directions or guidance given to a public authority or give further directions or guidance,as the Commissioner sees fit.
- (8) If—
  - (a) a referral of a matter by the Commissioner under this section included a requirement that the public authority submit a report or reports on action taken in respect of the matter; and
  - (b) the Commissioner is not satisfied that a public authority has duly and properly taken action in relation to the matter,

the Commissioner must inform the authority of the grounds of the Commissioner's dissatisfaction and give the authority an opportunity to comment within a specified time.

- (9) If, after considering any comments received from the public authority within the specified time, the Commissioner is still not satisfied, the Commissioner may submit a report to the Minister responsible for the authority setting out the grounds of dissatisfaction, together with any comments from the authority.
- (10) If, after considering any comments received from the Minister responsible for the public authority within 21 days after the report was submitted to the Minister, the Commissioner is still not satisfied, the Commissioner may provide to the President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly a report setting out the grounds of dissatisfaction.
- (11) The President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly must, on the first sitting day after receiving a report, lay it before their respective Houses.

### Subdivision 3—Action in relation to misconduct or maladministration

#### 36A—Exercise of powers of inquiry agency

- (1) The Commissioner must, before deciding (in accordance with section 24(2)(b) or (c)) to exercise the powers of an inquiry agency in respect of a matter raising potential issues of misconduct or maladministration in public administration, take reasonable steps to obtain the views of the agency.
- (2) If the Commissioner decides (in accordance with section 24(2)(b) or (c)) to exercise the powers of an inquiry agency in respect of such a matter—
  - (a) the Commissioner may, by notice in writing to the agency, require that the agency refrain from taking action in respect of the matter or require that the agency only take action of a specified kind in relation to the matter; and
  - (b) the Commissioner—
    - (i) has all the powers of the agency; and
    - (ii) is bound by any statutory provisions governing the exercise of those powers (subject to such modifications as may be prescribed, or as may be necessary for the purpose),as if the Commissioner constituted the agency; and
  - (c) the Commissioner must inform the agency of the outcome of the matter.
- (3) The Commissioner may at any time withdraw from exercising the powers of an inquiry agency, or decide to exercise such powers, as the Commissioner sees fit.

### 37—Referral to inquiry agency

The Commissioner must, before referring a matter raising a potential issue of misconduct or maladministration in public administration to an inquiry agency, take reasonable steps to obtain the views of the agency as to the referral.

### 38—Referral to public authority

- (1) The Commissioner or the Office must, before referring a matter raising a potential issue of misconduct or maladministration in public administration to a public authority, take reasonable steps to obtain the views of the authority as to the referral.
- (2) If a matter raising potential issues of misconduct or maladministration in public administration is referred to a public authority, the directions or guidance that may be given to the authority by the Commissioner or the Office include (without limitation)—
  - (a) a requirement that the authority submit a report or reports on action taken in respect of the matter as set out in the directions; and
  - (b) a recommendation as to the action that should be taken by the authority and the period within which it should be taken.
- (3) Neither the Commissioner nor the Office may give directions to the Governor or a judicial officer or to the Attorney-General in relation to a matter concerning the Governor or a judicial officer.
- (4) Neither the Commissioner nor the Office may give directions to a House of Parliament or the Joint Parliamentary Service Committee in relation to a matter concerning a public officer.
- (5) The Commissioner or the Office may disclose to the public authority information that the Commissioner or the Office has in respect of the matter.
- (6) The Commissioner may at any time—
  - (a) revoke a referral to a public authority; or
  - (b) revoke or vary directions or guidance given to a public authority or give further directions or guidance,as the Commissioner sees fit.
- (7) If the Office has given directions or guidance to a public authority, the Office may revoke or vary the directions or guidance or give further directions or guidance.
- (7a) If—
  - (a) a referral of a matter by the Commissioner or the Office under this section included a requirement that the public authority submit a report or reports on action taken in respect of the matter; and
  - (b) the Commissioner is not satisfied that a public authority has duly and properly taken action in relation to the matter,the Commissioner must inform the authority of the grounds of the Commissioner's dissatisfaction and give the authority an opportunity to comment within a specified time.
- (8) If, after considering any comments received from the public authority within the specified time, the Commissioner is still not satisfied, the Commissioner may submit a report to the Minister responsible for the authority setting out the grounds of dissatisfaction, together with any comments from the authority.

- (9) If, after considering any comments received from the Minister responsible for the public authority within 21 days after the report was submitted to the Minister, the Commissioner is still not satisfied, the Commissioner may provide to the President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly a report setting out the grounds of dissatisfaction.
- (10) The President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly must, on the first sitting day after receiving a report, lay it before their respective Houses.

### Subdivision 4—Request for Auditor-General to examine accounts

#### 39—Request for Auditor-General to examine accounts

The Commissioner may, if the Commissioner considers it appropriate in respect of any matter subject to an assessment, investigation or referral under this Act, request the Auditor-General to conduct an examination of accounts under the *Public Finance and Audit Act 1987*.

### Division 3—Evaluation of agency or authority practices

#### 40—Evaluation of practices, policies and procedures

- (1) If, in performing the Commissioner's functions, the Commissioner decides to evaluate the practices, policies and procedures of an inquiry agency or public authority, the Commissioner must inform the agency or authority as to the nature and timing of the evaluation.
- (2) An inquiry agency or public authority must assist the Commissioner in the conduct of the evaluation as requested by the Commissioner.
- (3) The Commissioner must prepare a report of the evaluation and provide a copy to the President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly.
- (4) The President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly must, on the first sitting day after receiving a report, lay it before their respective Houses.
- (5) The Commissioner may not evaluate the practices, policies and procedures of a House of Parliament or a judicial body.

### Division 4—Recommendations and reports by Commissioner

#### 41—Recommendations

- (1) On conducting an evaluation or in response to issues observed by the Commissioner in the course of an investigation or the handling of a matter referred to an inquiry agency or public authority, the Commissioner may recommend to an inquiry agency or public authority that the agency or authority—
  - (a) change practices, policies or procedures in a specified way or review practices, policies or procedures to achieve specified outcomes; or
  - (b) conduct, or participate in, specified educational programs or educational programs designed to achieve specified outcomes.

- (2) The Commissioner must prepare a report containing the recommendations and provide a copy to the President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly.
- (3) The President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly must, on the first sitting day after receiving a report, lay it before their respective Houses.
- (4) If the Commissioner is not satisfied that an inquiry agency or public authority has complied with the recommendations of the Commissioner, the Commissioner must inform the agency or authority of the grounds of the Commissioner's dissatisfaction and give the agency or authority an opportunity to comment within a specified time.
- (5) If, after considering any comments received from the inquiry agency or public authority within the specified time, the Commissioner is still not satisfied, the Commissioner may submit a report to the Minister responsible for the agency or authority setting out the grounds of dissatisfaction, together with any comments from the agency or authority.
- (6) If, after considering any comments received from the Minister responsible for the inquiry agency or public authority within 21 days after the report was submitted to the Minister, the Commissioner is still not satisfied, the Commissioner may provide to the President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly a report setting out the grounds of dissatisfaction.
- (7) The President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly must, on the first sitting day after receiving a report, lay it before their respective Houses.

#### 42—Reports

- (1) The Commissioner may prepare a report setting out—
  - (a) recommendations, formulated in the course of the performance of the Commissioner's functions, for the amendment or repeal of a law; or
  - (b) findings or recommendations resulting from completed investigations by the Commissioner in respect of matters raising potential issues of corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration; or
  - (c) other matters arising in the course of the performance of the Commissioner's functions that the Commissioner considers to be in the public interest to disclose.
- (1a) The Commissioner must not—
  - (a) prepare a report under this section setting out findings or recommendations resulting from a completed investigation into a potential issue of corruption in public administration unless—
    - (i) all criminal proceedings arising from that investigation are complete; or
    - (ii) the Commissioner is satisfied that no criminal proceedings will be commenced as a result of the investigation, in which case the report must not identify any person involved in the investigation; or

- (b) prepare a report under this section setting out findings or recommendations resulting from a completed investigation into a potential issue of misconduct or maladministration in public administration that identifies any person involved in the particular matter or matters the subject of the investigation unless the person consents.
- (2) A copy of the report must be provided—
  - (a) in the case of a report of a kind referred to in subsection (1)(b)—to the public authority responsible for any public officer to whom the report relates and to the Minister responsible for that public authority; and
  - (b) in any case—to the Attorney-General, the President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly.
- (3) The President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly must, on the first sitting day after 28 days (or such shorter number of days as the Attorney-General approves) have passed after receiving a report, lay it before their respective Houses.

#### Division 5—Miscellaneous

##### 43—Referral of matter etc does not limit performance of functions

The Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, an examiner or an investigator may perform functions or exercise powers in respect of a particular matter despite the referral of the matter for prosecution or investigation and prosecution, the institution of any proceedings before a judicial body or the charging of a person with an offence (but in such a case the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, examiner or investigator must endeavour to avoid, as far as practicable, prejudice to any person affected by the referral or proceedings or who is charged with the offence).

##### 44—Public authority to assist with compliance by public officers

- (1) A public authority must assist the public officers for whom it is responsible to comply with requirements and directions issued under this Act and, in particular, regard compliance as an official duty that may be performed during normal working hours.
- (2) If a public officer attends at a place in accordance with a direction, or as reasonably required by a direction, issued under this Act, the officer—
  - (a) will be taken not to be absent from work for the period for which the officer's attendance is required; and
  - (b) will, if attendance necessitates the absence of the officer from the officer's usual place of employment, be entitled to be reimbursed from the funds of the public authority responsible for the officer for expenses in respect of travel, accommodation and meals in accordance with rates determined by the Commissioner.

#### Part 5—Accountability

##### 45—Commissioner's annual report

- (1) The Commissioner must, before 30 September in each year, prepare a report on the operations of the Commissioner and the Office.



- (2) The report must—
- (a) relate to the financial year preceding the making of the report; and
  - (b) describe—
    - (i) the number and general nature of complaints and reports received by the Office; and
    - (ii) the number and general nature of matters investigated by the Commissioner; and
    - (iii) the number of warrants issued by the Commissioner and by judges of the Supreme Court; and
    - (iv) the number of examinations conducted; and
    - (v) the extent to which investigations have resulted in prosecutions or disciplinary action; and
    - (vi) the number and general nature of matters referred for investigation to the Commissioner of Police or other law enforcement agency; and
    - (vii) the number and general nature of occasions on which public statements have been made by the Commissioner; and
    - (viii) the number and general nature of matters referred to an inquiry agency or public authority; and
    - (ix) the number and general nature of directions or guidance given in referring matters under this Act; and
    - (x) the number and general nature of the occasions on which the Commissioner exercised the powers of an inquiry agency; and
    - (xi) the number and general nature of requests for examinations of accounts by the Auditor-General; and
    - (xii) the number and general nature of recommendations made to an inquiry agency or public authority by the Commissioner; and
    - (xiii) the number and general nature of reports made to the Attorney-General, President of the Legislative Council or Speaker of the House of Assembly; and
    - (xiv) a description of the activities carried out in relation to its evaluation and educational functions; and
  - (c) deal with any other matters stipulated by the regulations.
- (3) A copy of the report must be delivered to the President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly.
- (4) The President of the Legislative Council and the Speaker of the House of Assembly must, on the first sitting day after receiving a report, lay it before their respective Houses.

#### 46—Reviews

Reviews must be conducted in accordance with Schedule 4.

#### 47—Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee

The Commissioner must ensure that a copy of each annual report and other public report prepared by the Commissioner under this Act is promptly delivered to the Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee established under the *Parliamentary Committees Act 1991*.

#### 48—Commissioner's website

The Commissioner must maintain a website for the purposes of this Act and include on it—

- (a) information about the educational programs conducted or facilitated by the Commissioner; and
- (b) information about the evaluations of practices, policies and procedures of inquiry agencies and public authorities conducted by the Commissioner; and
- (c) information about the other functions of the Commissioner and the Office; and
- (d) the Commissioner's standard operating procedures; and
- (e) the reports prepared under section 41; and
- (f) the reports prepared under section 42; and
- (g) the Commissioner's annual reports; and
- (h) the reports on annual reviews laid before Parliament in accordance with Schedule 4; and
- (i) information designed to assist in preventing or minimising corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration or other material, as considered appropriate by the Commissioner.

#### 49—Provision of information to Attorney-General

- (1) The Commissioner must keep the Attorney-General informed of the general conduct of the functions of the Commissioner and the Office and, if the Attorney-General so requests, provide information to the Attorney-General relevant to the performance of the functions of the Commissioner or the Office (but not information identifying or about a particular matter subject to assessment, investigation or referral under this Act).
- (2) However, if the Commissioner is of the opinion that to provide information as requested by the Attorney-General would compromise the proper performance of the Commissioner's functions, the Commissioner may instead provide to the Governor a detailed written explanation of the reasons for the Commissioner's opinion.

### Part 6—Miscellaneous

#### 50—No obligation on persons to maintain secrecy

No obligation to maintain secrecy or other restriction on the disclosure of information applies for the purposes of a complaint, report, assessment, investigation or referral under this Act, except an obligation or restriction designed to keep the identity of an informant secret.

### 51—Arrangements for provision of information by Commissioner of Police

The Commissioner of Police is to enter into arrangements with the Commissioner under which the Commissioner and other persons performing functions under this Act are given access to confidential information and databases for the purposes of assessments and investigations under this Act and for appropriate protection of the confidentiality of the information accessed.

### 52—Commissioner and staff to be regarded as law enforcement body

The Commissioner and members of the staff of the Commissioner are, for the purposes of any other Act, to be regarded as a body established for law enforcement purposes (however described).

### 53—Impersonation of Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, examiner or investigator

A person must not falsely represent, by words or conduct, that he or she is the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, an examiner or an investigator.

Maximum penalty: \$5 000 or imprisonment for 1 year.

### 54—Confidentiality

- (1) Except as required or authorised by this Act or by the Commissioner, a person who is or has been engaged in the administration of this Act must not, directly or indirectly, disclose information in relation to or connected with a matter that forms or is the subject of a complaint, report, assessment, investigation, referral or evaluation under this Act.

Maximum penalty: \$2 500 or imprisonment for 6 months.

- (2) Despite subsection (1), a person engaged in the administration of this Act may disclose information—
- (a) for the purposes of the administration or enforcement of this Act; or
  - (b) for the purposes of referring a matter in accordance with this Act to a law enforcement agency, inquiry agency, public authority or public officer; or
  - (c) for the purposes of a criminal proceeding or a proceeding for the imposition of a penalty; or
  - (d) for the performance of the functions of the Office or the Commissioner under another Act; or
  - (e) as otherwise required or authorised by this or another Act.
- (3) A person who receives information knowing that the information is connected with a matter that forms or is the subject of a complaint, report, assessment, investigation, referral or evaluation under this Act must not disclose that information unless—
- (a) the person is authorised in writing by the Commissioner or by a person approved by the Commissioner under this section to give an authorisation; or
  - (b) the disclosure of that information is for the purpose of—
    - (i) dealing with a matter referred under this Act by the Commissioner or the Office; or

- (ii) a criminal proceeding, a proceeding for the imposition of a penalty or disciplinary action; or
  - (iii) a person obtaining legal advice or legal representation or for the purposes of determining whether a person is entitled to an indemnity for legal costs; or
  - (iv) a person obtaining medical or psychological assistance from a medical practitioner or psychologist; or
- (c) the information relates to the person and is disclosed by the person to a close family member of the person.

Maximum penalty: \$2 500 or imprisonment for 6 months.

- (4) For the purposes of subsection (3)(c), a person is a *close family member* of another person if—
- (a) 1 is a spouse of the other or is in a close personal relationship with the other; or
  - (b) 1 is a parent or grandparent of the other (whether by blood or by marriage); or
  - (c) 1 is a brother or sister of the other (whether by blood or by marriage); or
  - (d) 1 is a guardian or carer of the other.

### 55—Proceedings to be heard in private

- (1) Subject to an order of the court or judicial officer concerned to the contrary, proceedings for an application for a warrant or injunction under this Act, proceedings for contempt of the Commissioner and other proceedings under this Act (other than for an offence) must be heard in private.
- (2) Proceedings for an offence against this Act must be heard in private if a public hearing may prejudice an investigation under this Act or unduly prejudice the reputation of a person other than the defendant.

### 56—Publication of information and evidence

A person must not, except as authorised by the Commissioner or a court hearing proceedings for an offence against this Act, publish, or cause to be published—

- (a) information tending to suggest that a particular person is, has been, may be, or may have been, the subject of a complaint, report, assessment, investigation or referral under this Act; or
- (b) information that might enable a person who has made a complaint or report under this Act to be identified or located; or
- (c) the fact that a person has made or may be about to make a complaint or report under this Act; or
- (d) information that might enable a person who has given or may be about to give information or other evidence under this Act to be identified or located; or
- (e) the fact that a person has given or may be about to give information or other evidence under this Act; or

- (f) any other information or evidence publication of which is prohibited by the Commissioner.

Maximum penalty:

- (a) in the case of a body corporate—\$150 000;  
(b) in the case of a natural person—\$30 000.

#### 56A—Use of evidence or information

- (1) Subject to this Act (but despite any other Act or law) evidence or information obtained (whether before or after the commencement of this section) by the lawful exercise of powers in relation to suspected corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration—
- (a) may be used for the purposes of any other investigation in relation to suspected corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration; and
- (b) may be provided to, and may be received and used by—
- (i) law enforcement agencies and prosecution authorities for the purposes of any criminal investigation or proceedings or proceedings for the imposition of a penalty; and
- (ii) public authorities for the purposes of any disciplinary investigation or action in relation to suspected corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration,
- whether the investigation, proceedings or action relate to, or arise from, the same matter or a different matter; and
- (c) is not inadmissible in proceedings before a court merely because the evidence or information was not obtained for the purposes of those proceedings.
- (1a) For the purposes of subsection (1), evidence or information will be taken to be obtained by a lawful exercise of powers in relation to suspected corruption, misconduct or maladministration in public administration notwithstanding a jurisdictional error in the exercise of those powers.
- (2) No civil or criminal liability lies against a person in respect of any use of evidence or information permitted by this section.

#### 57—Victimisation

- (1) A person who causes detriment to another on the ground, or substantially on the ground, that the other person or a third person has made or intends to make a complaint or report under this Act or has provided, or intends to provide, information or other assistance to the Commissioner in connection with an investigation under this Act commits an act of victimisation.
- (2) Causing detriment on the ground that a person—
- (a) has made a false allegation; or
- (b) has not acted in good faith,
- does not constitute an act of victimisation.

- (3) An act of victimisation under this Act may be dealt with—
- (a) as a tort; or
- (b) as if it were an act of victimisation under the *Equal Opportunity Act 1984*, but, if the victim commences proceedings in a court seeking a remedy in tort, he or she cannot subsequently lodge a complaint under the *Equal Opportunity Act 1984* and, conversely, if the victim lodges a complaint under that Act, he or she cannot subsequently commence proceedings in a court seeking a remedy in tort.
- (4) If a complaint alleging an act of victimisation under this Act has been lodged with the Commissioner for Equal Opportunity and the Commissioner is of the opinion that the subject matter of the complaint has already been adequately dealt with by a competent authority, the Commissioner may decline to act on the complaint or to proceed further with action on the complaint.
- (5) In proceedings against a person seeking a remedy in tort for an act of victimisation committed by an employee or agent of the person, it is a defence to prove that the person exercised all reasonable diligence to ensure that the employee or agent would not commit an act of victimisation.
- (6) A person who personally commits an act of victimisation under this Act is guilty of an offence.
- Maximum penalty: \$10 000.
- (7) Proceedings for an offence against subsection (6) may only be commenced by a police officer or a person approved by either the Commissioner of Police or the Director of Public Prosecutions.
- (8) In this section—
- detriment* includes—
- (a) injury, damage or loss; or
- (b) intimidation or harassment; or
- (c) discrimination, disadvantage or adverse treatment in relation to a person's employment; or
- (d) threats of reprisal.

#### 58—Service

Subject to the regulations, a notice or other document required or authorised to be given to or served on a person under this Act may—

- (a) be given to the person personally; or
- (b) be left for the person at the person's place of residence or business with someone apparently over the age of 16 years; or
- (c) be posted to the person at the person's last known place of residence or business; or
- (d) be transmitted by fax or email to a fax number or email address provided by the person (in which case the notice or other document will be taken to have been given or served at the time of transmission); or

- (e) if the person is a company or registered body within the meaning of the *Corporations Act 2001* of the Commonwealth, be served in accordance with that Act.

## 59—Evidence

- (1) In proceedings, a certificate apparently executed by the Commissioner certifying as to a matter relating to—
- (a) the appointment of an examiner or investigator; or
  - (b) a delegation; or
  - (c) a notice; or
  - (d) an order; or
  - (e) the receipt or non-receipt of a document, statement of information or other thing,

under this Act constitutes proof, in the absence of proof to the contrary, of the matters so certified.

- (2) In proceedings, a certificate apparently executed by the Commissioner certifying that during a period specified in the certificate the Commissioner suspected that an offence may have been directly or indirectly connected with, or a part of, a course of activity involving the commission of corruption in public administration for the purposes of section 5(2) constitutes proof, in the absence of proof to the contrary, of the matters so certified.

## 60—Regulations

- (1) The Governor may make such regulations as are contemplated by this Act, or as are necessary or expedient for the purposes of this Act.
- (2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), the regulations may—
- (a) make provision for the payment of expenses or other amounts to persons required to attend before the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, an examiner or an investigator, produce a document or other thing or provide a copy of a document; and
  - (b) prescribe forms for the purposes of this Act; and
  - (c) prescribe the manner in which a summons or notice under Schedule 2 is to be served on or given to a person; and
  - (d) prescribe fines (not exceeding \$5 000) for offences against the regulations; and
  - (e) be of general application or vary in their application according to prescribed factors; and
  - (f) provide that a matter or thing in respect of which regulations may be made is to be determined according to the discretion of the Commissioner.

## 61—Review of operation of Act

The Attorney-General must, within 5 years after the commencement of this Act or any provision of this Act—

- (a) cause a report to be prepared on the operation of this Act; and
- (b) cause a copy of the report to be laid before each House of Parliament.

## Schedule 1—Public officers, public authorities and responsible Ministers

For the purposes of this Act, the table below lists public officers, the public authorities responsible for the officers and the Ministers responsible for the public authorities.

Public officers	Public authority	Minister
Governor	Attorney-General	Premier
a person appointed to an office by the Governor	Governor Attorney-General	Premier
a Member of the Legislative Council	Legislative Council	
an officer of the Legislative Council		
a person under the separate control of the President of the Legislative Council		
a Member of the House of Assembly	House of Assembly	
an officer of the House of Assembly		
a person under the separate control of the Speaker of the House of Assembly		
a member of the joint parliamentary service	Joint Parliamentary Service Committee	
the principal officer of a judicial body	Attorney-General	Premier
a judicial officer that constitutes a judicial body		
a judicial officer (other than a judicial officer who is the principal officer of a judicial body or who constitutes a judicial body)	the principal officer of the judicial body of which the judicial officer is a member Attorney-General	Premier
a member of the staff of the State Courts Administration Council	State Courts Administration Council	Attorney-General

4.9.2017—Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012  
Public officers, public authorities and responsible Ministers—Schedule 1

Public officers	Public authority	Minister
a person who constitutes a statutory authority or who is a statutory office holder	the Minister responsible for the administration of the Act under which the statutory authority is constituted or the statutory office holder is appointed	Premier
a person who is a member of the governing body of a statutory authority	the statutory authority or statutory office holder	the Minister responsible for the administration of the Act constituting the statutory authority or statutory office holder
an officer or employee of a statutory authority or statutory office holder or a Public Service employee assigned to assist the statutory authority or statutory office holder		
a member of a local government body	the local government body	the Minister responsible for the administration of the <i>Local Government Act 1999</i>
an officer or employee of a local government body		
the Local Government Association of South Australia	the Minister responsible for the administration of the <i>Local Government Act 1999</i>	Premier
a person who is a member of the governing body of the Local Government Association of South Australia	the Local Government Association of South Australia	the Minister responsible for the administration of the <i>Local Government Act 1999</i>
an officer or employee of the Local Government Association of South Australia		
the chief executive of an administrative unit of the Public Service	the Minister responsible for the administrative unit	Premier
a Public Service employee (other than a chief executive)	the chief executive of the administrative unit of the Public Service in which the employee is employed	the Minister responsible for the administrative unit
a police officer	Commissioner of Police	the Minister responsible for the administration of the <i>Police Act 1998</i>
a protective security officer appointed under the <i>Protective Security Act 2007</i>	Commissioner of Police	the Minister responsible for the administration of the <i>Protective Security Act 2007</i>
an officer or employee appointed by the employing authority under the <i>Education Act 1972</i>	the employing authority under the <i>Education Act 1972</i>	the Minister responsible for the administration of the <i>Education Act 1972</i>
a person appointed by the Premier under the <i>Public Sector Act 2009</i>	Premier	Attorney-General
a person appointed by the Minister under the <i>Public Sector Act 2009</i>	the Minister responsible for the administration of the <i>Public Sector Act 2009</i>	Premier

Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012—4.9.2017  
Schedule 1—Public officers, public authorities and responsible Ministers

Public officers	Public authority	Minister
any other public sector employee	the public sector agency that employs the employee	if the public sector agency is the Premier, the Attorney-General if the public sector agency is a Minister other than the Premier, the Premier in any other case, the Minister responsible for the public sector agency or the Premier
a person to whom a function or power of a public authority or a public officer is delegated in accordance with an Act	the public authority or the public authority responsible for the public officer (as the case requires)	if the public authority is the Premier, the Attorney-General if the public authority is a Minister other than the Premier, the Premier in any other case, the Minister responsible for the public authority
a person who is, in accordance with an Act, assisting a public officer in the enforcement of the Act	the public authority responsible for the public officer	the Minister responsible for the public authority
a person performing contract work for a public authority or the Crown	if the work is performed for a public authority, the public authority or, in any other case, the Premier	the Minister responsible for the public authority
a person declared by regulation to be a public officer	the person declared by regulation to be the public authority responsible for the public officer	the Minister declared by regulation to be responsible for the public authority and its public officers

## Schedule 2—Examination and production of documents and other things

### 1—Interpretation

In this Schedule—

*examiner* means—

- (a) the Commissioner; or
- (b) the Deputy Commissioner; or
- (c) an examiner appointed by the Commissioner;

*official matter* means any of the following (whether past, present or contingent):

- (a) an investigation into corruption in public administration;
- (b) an examination held by an examiner;
- (c) court proceedings.

### 2—Examinations

An examiner may conduct an examination for the purposes of an investigation into corruption in public administration.

### 3—Conduct of examination

- (1) An examiner may regulate the conduct of proceedings at an examination as the examiner thinks fit.
- (2) At an examination before an examiner—
  - (a) a person giving evidence may be represented by a legal practitioner; and
  - (b) if, by reason of the existence of special circumstances, the examiner consents to a person who is not giving evidence being represented by a legal practitioner—the person may be so represented.
- (3) An examination before an examiner must be held in private and the examiner may give directions as to the persons who may be present during the examination or a part of the examination.
- (4) Nothing in a direction given by the examiner under subclause (3) prevents the presence, when evidence is being taken at an examination before the examiner, of—
  - (a) a person representing the person giving evidence; or
  - (b) a person representing, in accordance with subclause (2), a person who, by reason of a direction given by the examiner under subclause (3), is entitled to be present.
- (5) If an examination before an examiner is being held, a person (other than a member of the staff of the Commissioner approved by the examiner) must not be present at the examination unless the person is entitled to be present by reason of a direction given by the examiner under subclause (3) or by reason of subclause (4).
- (6) At an examination before an examiner—
  - (a) counsel assisting the examiner generally or in relation to the matter to which the investigation relates; or
  - (b) any person authorised by the examiner to appear before the examiner at the examination; or
  - (c) any legal practitioner representing a person at the examination in accordance with subclause (2),

may, so far as the examiner thinks appropriate, examine or cross-examine any witness on any matter that the examiner considers relevant to the investigation or any other investigation.
- (7) If a person (other than a member of the staff of the Commissioner) is present at an examination before an examiner while another person (the *witness*) is giving evidence at the examination, the examiner must—
  - (a) inform the witness that the person is present; and
  - (b) give the witness an opportunity to comment on the presence of the person.
- (8) A person does not cease to be entitled to be present at an examination before an examiner or part of such an examination if—
  - (a) the examiner fails to comply with subclause (7); or
  - (b) a witness comments adversely on the presence of the person under subclause (7)(b).

- (9) An examiner may direct that—
  - (a) any evidence given before the examiner; or
  - (b) the contents of any document, or a description of any thing, produced to the examiner; or
  - (c) any information that might enable a person who has given evidence before the examiner to be identified; or
  - (d) the fact that any person has given or may be about to give evidence at an examination,

must not be communicated or provided to any person, or must not be communicated or provided except in such manner, and to such persons, as the examiner specifies.
- (10) The examiner must give such a direction if the failure to do so might prejudice the safety or reputation of a person or prejudice the fair trial of a person who has been, or may be, charged with an offence.
- (11) Subject to subclause (12), the Commissioner may, in writing, vary or revoke a direction under subclause (9).
- (12) The Commissioner must not vary or revoke a direction if to do so might prejudice the safety or reputation of a person or prejudice the fair trial of a person who has been or may be charged with an offence.
- (13) If—
  - (a) a person has been charged with an offence; and
  - (b) the court considers that it may be desirable in the interests of justice that particular evidence given before an examiner, being evidence in relation to which the examiner has given a direction under subclause (9), be made available to the person or to a legal practitioner representing the person,

the court may give to the examiner or to the Commissioner a certificate to that effect and, if the court does so, the examiner or the Commissioner, as the case may be, must make the evidence available to the court.
- (14) If—
  - (a) the examiner or the Commissioner makes evidence available to a court in accordance with subclause (13); and
  - (b) the court, after examining the evidence, is satisfied that the interests of justice so require,

the court may make the evidence available to the person charged with the offence concerned or to a legal practitioner representing the person.
- (15) A person who—
  - (a) is present at an examination in contravention of subclause (5); or
  - (b) makes a publication in contravention of a direction given under subclause (9),

is guilty of an offence.

Maximum penalty: \$5 000 or imprisonment for 1 year.

- (16) At the conclusion of an examination held by an examiner, the examiner must give the person heading the investigation—
- (a) a record of the proceedings of the examination; and
  - (b) any documents or other things given to the examiner at, or in connection with, the examination.

#### 4—Power to summon witnesses and take evidence

- (1) An examiner may summon a person to appear before the examiner at an examination to give evidence and to produce such documents or other things (if any) as are referred to in the summons.
- (2) Before issuing a summons under subclause (1), the examiner must be satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.
- (3) The examiner must also record in writing the reasons for the issue of the summons.
- (4) A summons under subclause (1) requiring a person to appear before an examiner at an examination must, unless the examiner issuing the summons is satisfied that, in the particular circumstances of the investigation to which the examination relates, it would prejudice the effectiveness of the investigation for the summons to do so, set out, so far as is reasonably practicable, the general nature of the matters in relation to which the examiner intends to question the person, but nothing in this subclause prevents the examiner from questioning the person in relation to any matter that relates to an investigation into corruption in public administration.
- (5) The examiner who is holding an examination may require a person appearing at the examination to produce a document or other thing.
- (6) An examiner may, at an examination, take evidence on oath or affirmation and for that purpose—
  - (a) the examiner may require a person appearing at the examination to give evidence either to take an oath or to make an affirmation in a form approved by the examiner; and
  - (b) the examiner, or a person who is a member of the staff of the Commissioner authorised for the purpose by the Commissioner, may administer an oath or affirmation to a person so appearing at the examination.
- (7) The powers conferred by this clause are not exercisable except for the purposes of an investigation into corruption in public administration.

#### 5—Power to obtain documents

- (1) An examiner may, by notice in writing served on a person, require the person—
  - (a) to attend, at a time and place specified in the notice, before a person specified in the notice, being the examiner or a member of the staff of the Commissioner; and
  - (b) to produce at that time and place to the person so specified a document or other thing specified in the notice, being a document or other thing that is relevant to an investigation into corruption in public administration.
- (2) Before issuing a notice under subclause (1), the examiner must be satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.

- (3) The examiner must also record in writing the reasons for the issue of the notice.
- (4) A notice may be issued under this clause in relation to an investigation into corruption in public administration, whether or not an examination before an examiner is being held for the purposes of the investigation.
- (5) A person must not refuse or fail to comply with a notice served on the person under this clause.  
Maximum penalty: \$20 000 or imprisonment for 4 years.
- (6) The provisions of clause 8(3) to (6) apply in relation to a person who is required to produce a document or thing by a notice served on him or her under this clause in the same manner as they apply in relation to a person who is required to produce a document or thing at an examination before an examiner.

#### 6—Disclosure of summons or notice may be prohibited

- (1) The examiner issuing a summons under clause 4 or a notice under clause 5 must, or may, as provided in subclause (2), include in it a notation to the effect that disclosure of information about the summons or notice, or any official matter connected with it, is prohibited except in the circumstances, if any, specified in the notation.
- (2) A notation must not be included in the summons or notice except as follows:
  - (a) the examiner must include the notation if satisfied that failure to do so would reasonably be expected to prejudice—
    - (i) the safety or reputation of a person; or
    - (ii) the fair trial of a person who has been or may be charged with an offence; or
    - (iii) the effectiveness of an investigation;
  - (b) the examiner may include the notation if satisfied that failure to do so might prejudice—
    - (i) the safety or reputation of a person; or
    - (ii) the fair trial of a person who has been or may be charged with an offence; or
    - (iii) the effectiveness of an investigation;
  - (c) the examiner may include the notation if satisfied that failure to do so might otherwise be contrary to the public interest.
- (3) If a notation is included in the summons or notice, it must be accompanied by a written statement setting out the rights and obligations conferred or imposed by clause 7 on the person who was served with, or otherwise given, the summons or notice.
- (4) If, after the investigation concerned has been concluded—
  - (a) no evidence of an offence has been obtained; or
  - (b) evidence of an offence or offences has been assembled and the Commissioner has been advised that no person will be prosecuted; or
  - (c) evidence of an offence or offences committed by only 1 person has been assembled and criminal proceedings have begun against that person; or



- (d) evidence of an offence or offences committed by 2 or more persons has been assembled and—
  - (i) criminal proceedings have begun against all those persons; or
  - (ii) criminal proceedings have begun against 1 or more of those persons and the Commissioner has been advised that no other of those persons will be prosecuted,

all the notations that were included under this clause in any summonses or notices relating to the operation or investigation are cancelled by this subclause.

- (5) If a notation is cancelled by subclause (4), the Commissioner must serve a written notice of that fact on each person who was served with, or otherwise given, the summons or notice containing the notation.

#### 7—Offences of disclosure

- (1) A person who is served with, or otherwise given, a summons or notice containing a notation made under clause 6 must not disclose—
  - (a) the existence of the summons or notice or any information about it; or
  - (b) the existence of, or any information about, any official matter connected with the summons or notice.

Maximum penalty: \$5 000 or imprisonment for 1 year.

- (2) Subclause (1) does not prevent the person from making a disclosure—
  - (a) in accordance with the circumstances, if any, specified in the notation; or
  - (b) to a legal practitioner for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or representation relating to the summons, notice or matter; or
  - (c) if the person is a body corporate—to an officer or agent of the body corporate for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the summons or notice; or
  - (d) if the person is a legal practitioner—for the purpose of obtaining the agreement of another person under clause 8(3) to the legal practitioner answering a question or producing a document at an examination before an examiner; or
  - (e) to a person or body for the purpose of determining whether the person is entitled to obtain an indemnity for legal costs.
- (3) If a disclosure is made to a person as permitted by subclause (2) or (4), the following provisions apply:
  - (a) while he or she is a person of a kind to whom a disclosure is so permitted to be made, he or she must not disclose the existence of, or any information about, the summons or notice, or any official matter connected with it, except as permitted by subclause (4);
  - (b) while he or she is no longer such a person, he or she must not, in any circumstances, make a record of, or disclose the existence of, the summons, notice or matter, or disclose any information about any of them.

Maximum penalty: \$5 000 or imprisonment for 1 year.

- (4) A person to whom information has been disclosed, as permitted by subclause (2) or this subclause, may disclose that information—
  - (a) if the person is an officer or agent of a body corporate referred to in subclause (2)(c)—
    - (i) to another officer or agent of the body corporate for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the summons or notice; or
    - (ii) to a legal practitioner for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or representation relating to the summons, notice or matter; or
  - (b) if the person is a legal practitioner—for the purpose of giving legal advice, or making representations, relating to the summons, notice or matter.
- (5) This clause ceases to apply to a summons or notice after—
  - (a) the notation contained in the summons or notice is cancelled by clause 6(4); or
  - (b) 5 years elapse after the issue of the summons or notice, whichever is sooner.
- (6) A reference in this clause to disclosing something's existence includes disclosing information from which a person could reasonably be expected to infer its existence.

#### 8—Failure of witnesses to attend and answer questions

- (1) A person served, as prescribed, with a summons to appear as a witness at an examination before an examiner must not—
  - (a) fail to attend as required by the summons; or
  - (b) fail to attend from day to day unless excused, or released from further attendance, by the examiner.

Maximum penalty: \$20 000 or imprisonment for 4 years.

- (2) A person appearing as a witness at an examination before an examiner must not—
  - (a) when required pursuant to clause 4 either to take an oath or make an affirmation—refuse or fail to comply with the requirement; or
  - (b) refuse or fail to answer a question that he or she is required to answer by the examiner; or
  - (c) refuse or fail to produce a document or thing that he or she was required to produce by a summons under this Act served on him or her as prescribed.

Maximum penalty: \$20 000 or imprisonment for 4 years.

- (3) If—
  - (a) a legal practitioner is required to answer a question or produce a document at an examination before an examiner; and
  - (b) the answer to the question would disclose, or the document contains, a privileged communication made by or to the legal practitioner in his or her capacity as a legal practitioner,

the legal practitioner is entitled to refuse to comply with the requirement unless the person to whom or by whom the communication was made agrees to the legal practitioner complying with the requirement but, where the legal practitioner refuses to comply with the requirement, he or she must, if so required by the examiner, give the examiner the name and address of the person to whom or by whom the communication was made.

Maximum penalty: \$20 000 or imprisonment for 4 years.

- (4) Subclause (5) limits the use that can be made of any answers given at an examination before an examiner, or documents or things produced at an examination before an examiner and that subclause only applies if—
- (a) a person appearing as a witness at an examination before an examiner—
    - (i) answers a question that he or she is required to answer by the examiner; or
    - (ii) produces a document or thing that he or she was required to produce by a summons under this Act served on him or her as prescribed; and
  - (b) in the case of the production of a document that is, or forms part of, a record of an existing or past business—the document sets out details of earnings received by the person in respect of his or her employment and does not set out any other information; and
  - (c) before answering the question or producing the document or thing, the person claims that the answer, or the production of the document or thing, might tend to incriminate the person or make the person liable to a penalty.
- (5) The answer, or the document or thing, is not admissible in evidence against the person in—
- (a) a criminal proceeding; or
  - (b) a proceeding for the imposition of a penalty,
- other than—
- (c) proceedings under the *Criminal Assets Confiscation Act 2005*; or
  - (d) a proceeding in respect of—
    - (i) in the case of an answer—the falsity of the answer; or
    - (ii) in the case of the production of a document—the falsity of any statement contained in the document.
- (6) Subclause (3) does not affect the law relating to legal professional privilege.

#### 9—Warrant for arrest of witness

- (1) If, on application by an examiner, a judge of the Supreme Court is satisfied by evidence on oath that there are reasonable grounds to believe—
- (a) that a person who has been ordered, under clause 18, to deliver his or her passport to the examiner, whether or not the person has complied with the order, is nevertheless likely to leave Australia for the purpose of avoiding giving evidence before the examiner; or

- (b) that a person in relation to whom a summons has been issued under clause 4(1)—
    - (i) has absconded or is likely to abscond; or
    - (ii) is otherwise attempting, or is otherwise likely to attempt, to evade service of the summons; or
  - (c) that a person has committed an offence under clause 8(1) or is likely to do so, the judge may issue a warrant for the apprehension of the person.
- (2) The warrant may be executed by any person to whom it is addressed and the person executing it has power to break into and enter any premises or vehicle for the purpose of executing it.
- (3) The warrant may be executed even if the warrant is not at the time in the possession of the person executing it.
- (4) A person executing the warrant may only use such reasonable force as is necessary for the execution.
- (5) If a person is apprehended under the warrant, he or she must be brought, as soon as practicable, before a judge of the Supreme Court and the judge may—
- (a) admit the person to bail, with such security as the judge thinks fit, on such conditions as he or she thinks necessary to ensure the appearance of the person as a witness before the examiner; or
  - (b) order the continued detention of the person for the purposes of ensuring his or her appearance as such a witness; or
  - (c) order the release of the person.
- (6) If a person is under detention under this clause, he or she must, within 14 days after he or she was brought, or last brought, before a judge of the Supreme Court in accordance with this clause, or within such shorter or longer time as a judge has fixed upon the last previous appearance of the person before a judge under this clause, be again brought before a judge and the judge may then exercise any of the powers of a judge under subclause (5).
- (7) In this clause—

*Australia* includes the external Territories.

#### 10—False or misleading evidence

A person must not, at an examination before an examiner, give evidence that the person knows is false or misleading in a material particular.

Maximum penalty: \$20 000 or imprisonment for 4 years.

#### 11—Protection of witnesses from harm or intimidation

If it appears to an examiner that, by reason of the fact that a person—

- (a) is to appear, is appearing or has appeared at an examination before the examiner to give evidence or to produce a document or thing; or

- (b) proposes to furnish or has furnished information, or proposes to produce or has produced a document or thing, to the Commissioner or the Office otherwise than at an examination before the examiner,

the safety of the person may be prejudiced or the person may be subjected to intimidation or harassment, the examiner may make such arrangements (including arrangements with South Australia Police) as are necessary to avoid prejudice to the safety of the person, or to protect the person from intimidation or harassment.

## 12—Contempt of Commissioner

A person is in contempt of the Commissioner if he or she—

- (a) when appearing as a witness at an examination before an examiner—
- (i) refuses or fails to take an oath or affirmation when required to do so under clause 4; or
  - (ii) refuses or fails to answer a question that he or she is required to answer by the examiner; or
  - (iii) refuses or fails to produce a document or other thing that he or she was required to produce by a summons or notice under this Act that was served on him or her in accordance with this Act; or
- (b) is a legal practitioner who is required to answer a question or produce a document at an examination before an examiner, and both of the following apply:
- (i) the answer to the question would disclose, or the document contains, a privileged communication made by or to the legal practitioner in his or her capacity as a legal practitioner;
  - (ii) he or she refuses to comply with the requirement and does not, when required by the examiner, give the examiner the name and address of the person to whom or by whom the communication was made; or
- (c) gives evidence at an examination before an examiner that he or she knows is false or misleading in a material particular; or
- (d) obstructs or hinders an examiner in the performance of his or her functions as an examiner; or
- (e) disrupts an examination before an examiner; or
- (f) threatens a person present at an examination before an examiner.

## 13—Supreme Court to deal with contempt

- (1) If an examiner is of the opinion that, during an examination before the examiner, a person is in contempt of the Commissioner, the examiner may apply to the Supreme Court for the person to be dealt with in relation to the contempt.
- (2) Before making the application, the examiner must inform the person that the examiner proposes to make the application.
- (3) The application must be accompanied by a certificate that states—
  - (a) the grounds for making the application; and
  - (b) evidence in support of the application.

- (4) A copy of the certificate must be given to the person before, or at the same time as, the application is made.
- (5) If, after—
  - (a) considering the matters specified in the certificate; and
  - (b) hearing or receiving any evidence or statements by or in support of the Commissioner; and
  - (c) hearing or receiving any evidence or statements by or in support of the person,

the Supreme Court finds that the person was in contempt of the Commissioner, the Court may deal with the person as if the acts or omissions involved constituted a contempt of that Court.

## 14—Conduct of contempt proceedings

- (1) This clause applies if an application for a person to be dealt with in relation to a contempt of the Commissioner is made to the Supreme Court under clause 13.
- (2) Proceedings in relation to the application are, subject to this Act, to be instituted, carried on, heard and determined in accordance with the laws (including any rules of court) that apply in relation to the punishment of a contempt of the Supreme Court.
- (3) In proceedings in relation to the application, a certificate under clause 13(3) is prima facie evidence of the matters specified in the certificate.

## 15—Person in contempt may be detained

- (1) If an examiner proposes to make an application under clause 13(1) in respect of a person, he or she may, during the hearing concerned, direct a police officer to detain the person for the purpose of bringing the person before the Supreme Court for the hearing of the application.
- (2) If the person is detained under subclause (1)—
  - (a) the examiner must apply to the Court as soon as practicable under clause 13(1) in respect of the person; and
  - (b) the person must, subject to subclause (3), be brought before the Court as soon as practicable.
- (3) The Court may—
  - (a) direct that the person be released from detention on condition that he or she will appear before the Court in relation to the application; or
  - (b) order that the person continue to be detained until the application is determined.
- (4) The Court may also impose any other condition on the release, for example—
  - (a) that the person surrenders his or her passport; or
  - (b) that the person gives an undertaking as to his or her living arrangements; or
  - (c) that the person reports as required to a law enforcement agency.
- (5) The Court may at any time vary or revoke a condition imposed under subclause (4).

## 16—Examiner may withdraw contempt application

- (1) An examiner may at any time withdraw an application in relation to a person under clause 13(1).
- (2) If—
  - (a) the examiner does so; and
  - (b) the person is in detention under clause 15,the person must be released from detention immediately.

## 17—Legal protection of examiners, counsel and witnesses

- (1) An examiner has, in the performance of his or her functions or the exercise of his or her powers as an examiner in relation to an examination before the examiner, the same protection and immunity as a judge of the Supreme Court.
- (2) A legal practitioner assisting the Commissioner or an examiner or representing a person at an examination before an examiner has the same protection and immunity as a legal practitioner has in appearing for a party in proceedings in the Supreme Court.
- (3) Subject to this Act, a person summoned to attend or appearing before an examiner as a witness has the same protection as a witness in proceedings in the Supreme Court.

## 18—Order for delivery to examiner of passport of witness

- (1) If, on application by an examiner, a judge of the Supreme Court is satisfied by evidence on oath that—
  - (a) in connection with an investigation into corruption in public administration, a summons has been issued under this Act requiring a person to appear before an examiner at an examination (whether or not the summons has been served), or a person has appeared before an examiner at an examination, to give evidence or to produce documents or other things; and
  - (b) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person may be able to give to the examiner evidence or further evidence that is, or to produce to the examiner documents or other things or further documents or other things that are, relevant to the investigation and could be of particular significance to the investigation; and
  - (c) there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person intends to leave Australia and has in his or her possession, custody or control of a passport issued to him or her,

the judge may make an order requiring the person to appear before a judge of the Supreme Court on a date, and at a time and place, specified in the order to show cause why he or she should not be ordered to deliver the passport to the examiner.

- (2) If a person appears before a judge of the Supreme Court under an order made under subclause (1), the judge may, if he or she thinks fit, make an order—
  - (a) requiring the person to deliver to the examiner any passport issued to him or her that is in his or her possession, custody or control; and
  - (b) authorising the examiner to retain the passport until the expiration of such period (not exceeding 1 month) as is specified in the order.

- (3) A judge of the Supreme Court may, on application by the examiner, extend for a further period (not exceeding 1 month) or further periods (not exceeding 1 month in each case) the period for which the examiner is authorised to retain a passport under an order made under subclause (2), but not so that the total period for which the examiner is authorised to retain the passport exceeds 3 months.
- (4) A judge of the Supreme Court may, at any time while the examiner is authorised under an order made under this clause to retain a passport issued to a person, on application made by the person, revoke the order and, if the order is revoked, the examiner must immediately return the passport to the person.
- (5) In this clause—

*Australia* includes the external Territories.

## 19—Offence to hinder, obstruct or disrupt

A person must not—

- (a) hinder or obstruct an examiner in the performance of his or her functions as an examiner; or
- (b) disrupt an examination before an examiner.

Maximum penalty: \$20 000 or imprisonment for 4 years.

## Schedule 3—Search warrants and privilege

### 1—Interpretation

In this Schedule—

*claimant*—see clause 2(1)(b);

*searcher*—see clause 2(1)(a).

### 2—Privilege claims in relation to search warrants

- (1) This clause applies if—
  - (a) a person executing a warrant (the *searcher*) wishes to inspect, copy or seize a document or other thing under the warrant; and
  - (b) a person who is entitled to claim the privilege (the *claimant*) claims that the document or other thing is the subject of privilege.
- (2) The searcher must consider the claim of privilege and either—
  - (a) cease exercising the power under the warrant in relation to the document or other thing over which the claim of privilege is made; or
  - (b) require the claimant to immediately seal the document or other thing in an envelope, or otherwise secure it if it cannot be sealed in an envelope, and give it to the searcher.
- (3) The searcher must not inspect the document or other thing in considering the claim of privilege.

- (4) If the searcher requires the claimant to give the document or other thing to the searcher under subclause (2)(b), the searcher must—
  - (a) notify the Commissioner as soon as is reasonably practicable; and
  - (b) as soon as is reasonably practicable, give the document or other thing to the proper officer of the Supreme Court to be held in safe custody.
- (5) Subject to clause 4, a person must not open a sealed envelope or interfere with a document or thing secured otherwise than in an envelope before delivery to the proper officer of the Supreme Court.

### 3—Application to Supreme Court to determine privilege

- (1) Within 7 days after a sealed envelope or document or thing secured otherwise than in an envelope is given to the proper officer of the Supreme Court in accordance with clause 2, the claimant may apply to the Supreme Court to determine whether or not the document or other thing is the subject of privilege.
- (2) If no application is made under subclause (1) within the period of 7 days, the proper officer must give the document or thing to the Commissioner.
- (3) The claimant must give notice of the application to the Commissioner within a reasonable time before the hearing of the application.
- (4) Notice under subclause (3) must be in the prescribed form.
- (5) The Commissioner is entitled to appear and be heard on the hearing of the application.

### 4—Determination of privilege claims

- (1) On an application under clause 3, the Supreme Court must determine whether or not the document in the sealed envelope or the document or thing secured otherwise than in an envelope is the subject of privilege (in whole or in part).
- (2) For the purpose of making a determination under subclause (1), the Judge constituting the Supreme Court and any other person authorised by the Court may—
  - (a) open the sealed envelope or access the document or thing secured otherwise than in an envelope; and
  - (b) inspect the document or thing.
- (3) If the Supreme Court determines that the whole of the document or thing is the subject of privilege—
  - (a) the Court must order that the document or thing be returned to the claimant; and
  - (b) the proper officer must return the document or thing to the claimant.
- (4) If the Supreme Court determines that the document or thing is not the subject of privilege—
  - (a) the Court must order that the document or thing be given to the Commissioner; and
  - (b) the proper officer must release the document or thing accordingly.

- (5) If the Supreme Court determines that a part of the document or thing is the subject of privilege (the *privileged part*) and a part is not (the *non-privileged part*)—
  - (a) if the document or thing is able to be divided into the privileged part and the non-privileged part—
    - (i) the Court must so divide the document or thing and order that the privileged part be returned to the claimant and the non-privileged part be given to the Commissioner; and
    - (ii) the proper officer must return the privileged part to the claimant and release the non-privileged part to the Commissioner; or
  - (b) if paragraph (a) does not apply but the Court is of the opinion that it would be possible to produce a copy of the document or thing from which the privileged part is able to be redacted—
    - (i) the Court must make such orders as the Court thinks fit for the production of such a copy; and
    - (ii) the Court must order that the copy so produced be given to the Commissioner and that the document or thing be returned to the claimant; and
    - (iii) the proper officer must—
      - (A) release the copy so produced to the Commissioner; and
      - (B) return the document or thing to the claimant; or
  - (c) in any other case—
    - (i) the Court must order that the document or thing be returned to the claimant; and
    - (ii) the proper officer must return the document or thing to the claimant.
- (6) Except as provided in subclause (2), a person must not open the sealed envelope or otherwise have access to the document or thing contained in the sealed envelope before—
  - (a) the Supreme Court determines the claim of privilege; or
  - (b) the document or thing is given to the claimant.Maximum penalty: \$5 000 or imprisonment for 1 year.
- (7) Except as provided in subclause (2), a person must not open or otherwise have access to a document or thing secured otherwise than in an envelope before—
  - (a) the Supreme Court determines the claim of privilege; or
  - (b) the document or thing is returned to the claimant.Maximum penalty: \$5 000 or imprisonment for 1 year.

## Schedule 4—Reviews

### 1—Interpretation

In this Schedule—

*Committee* means the Crime and Public Integrity Policy Committee established under the *Parliamentary Committees Act 1991*;

*employees of the Commissioner* includes staff subject to an arrangement under section 13;

*employees of the Office* means the employees assigned to the Office in accordance with section 18(3);

*relevant complaint* means a complaint made in accordance with any requirements prescribed by the regulations relating to an abuse of power, impropriety or other misconduct on the part of the Commissioner or employees of the Commissioner or of the Office;

*reviewer*—see clause 2(1).

### 2—Appointment of reviewer

- (1) The Attorney-General must appoint a person (the *reviewer*)—
  - (a) to conduct annual reviews examining the operations of the Commissioner and the Office during each financial year; and
  - (b) to conduct reviews relating to relevant complaints received by the reviewer; and
  - (c) to conduct other reviews at the request of the Attorney-General or the Committee; and
  - (d) to perform other functions conferred on the reviewer by the Attorney-General or by another Act.
- (2) The reviewer—
  - (a) subject to subclause (3), must be a person who would be eligible for appointment as the Commissioner; and
  - (b) will be appointed under this section for a term not exceeding 3 years and on conditions determined by the Attorney-General and, at the end of a term of appointment, will be eligible for reappointment.
- (3) Despite section 8(3)(b), a person who is not appointed as a judicial officer on a permanent basis may be appointed as the reviewer.
- (4) The appointment of the reviewer may be terminated by the Attorney-General on the ground that the reviewer—
  - (a) has been guilty of misconduct; or
  - (b) has been convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment; or
  - (c) has become bankrupt or has applied to take the benefit of a law for the relief of insolvent debtors; or

- (d) has been disqualified from managing corporations under Chapter 2D Part 2D.6 of the *Corporations Act 2001* of the Commonwealth; or
  - (e) has, because of mental or physical incapacity, failed to carry out duties of the position satisfactorily; or
  - (f) is incompetent or has neglected the duties of the position.
- (5) The appointment of the reviewer is terminated if the reviewer—
    - (a) becomes a member, or a candidate for election as a member, of the Parliament of a State or the Commonwealth or a Legislative Assembly of a Territory of the Commonwealth; or
    - (b) is sentenced to imprisonment for an offence.
  - (6) The reviewer may resign by notice in writing to the Attorney-General of not less than 3 months (or such shorter period as is accepted by the Attorney-General).
  - (7) The reviewer is a senior official for the purposes of the *Public Sector (Honesty and Accountability) Act 1995*.

### 3—Reviews

- (1) Without limiting the matters that may be the subject of a review, the reviewer—
  - (a) must, in the case of an annual review, consider the following in relation to the financial year to which the review relates:
    - (i) whether the powers under this Act were exercised in an appropriate manner, including—
      - (A) whether there was any evidence of—
        - maladministration in public administration on the part of the Commissioner or employees of the Commissioner or of the Office; or
        - unreasonable delay in the conduct of investigations under this Act; or
        - unreasonable invasions of privacy by the Commissioner or employees of the Commissioner or of the Office; and
      - (B) whether undue prejudice to the reputation of any person was caused;
    - (ii) whether the practices and procedures of the Commissioner and the Office were effective and efficient;
    - (iii) whether the operations made an appreciable difference to the prevention or minimisation of corruption, misconduct and maladministration in public administration; and
  - (b) may examine any particular exercises of power by the Commissioner or the Office; and
  - (c) may make any recommendations to the Commissioner or to the Attorney-General that the reviewer thinks fit.

- (2) The Commissioner must ensure that the reviewer is provided with such information as the reviewer may require for the purpose of conducting a review.
- (3) On completing a review, or at any time during a review, the reviewer may do either or both of the following:
  - (a) refer a matter to the relevant law enforcement agency for further investigation and potential prosecution;
  - (b) refer a matter to the Commissioner or a public authority for further investigation and potential disciplinary action against a public officer for whom the Commissioner or authority is responsible.
- (4) Before referring a matter under subclause (3), the reviewer must notify the Commissioner of the proposed referral unless the reviewer is of the opinion that it would be inappropriate to do so in the circumstances of the case.
- (5) The reviewer may disclose to the relevant law enforcement agency, or to the Commissioner or public authority, information that the reviewer has in respect of the matter.
- (6) A report on a review must be presented to the Attorney-General—
  - (a) in the case of an annual review examining the operations of the Commissioner and the Office and relevant complaints received during a financial year—on or before 30 September in the following financial year; or
  - (b) in any other case—as soon as practicable after completion of the review.
- (7) The reviewer—
  - (a) must, in preparing a report on a review, consider the effect of the proposed report on any complaint, report, assessment, investigation or referral under this Act; and
  - (b) must not include information in a report if publication of the information would constitute an offence against section 56.
- (8) The Attorney-General must, within 12 sitting days after receipt of a report on an annual review, cause copies of the report to be laid before each House of Parliament.

## Legislative history

### Notes

- Please note—References in the legislation to other legislation or instruments or to titles of bodies or offices are not automatically updated as part of the program for the revision and publication of legislation and therefore may be obsolete.
- Earlier versions of this Act (historical versions) are listed at the end of the legislative history.
- For further information relating to the Act and subordinate legislation made under the Act see the Index of South Australian Statutes or [www.legislation.sa.gov.au](http://www.legislation.sa.gov.au).

### Legislation amended by principal Act

The *Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012* amended the following:

*Australian Crime Commission (South Australia) Act 2004*  
*Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006*  
*City of Adelaide Act 1998*  
*Correctional Services Act 1982*  
*Criminal Investigation (Covert Operations) Act 2009*  
*Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935*  
*Criminal Law (Forensic Procedures) Act 2007*  
*Defamation Act 2005*  
*Freedom of Information Act 1991*  
*Legal Practitioners Act 1981*  
*Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 1972*  
*Local Government Act 1999*  
*Ombudsman Act 1972*  
*Parliamentary Committees Act 1991*  
*Police Act 1998*  
*Police (Complaints and Disciplinary Proceedings) Act 1985*  
*Protective Security Act 2007*  
*Public Finance and Audit Act 1987*  
*Public Sector Act 2009*  
*Shop Theft (Alternative Enforcement) Act 2000*  
*Summary Offences Act 1953*  
*Terrorism (Preventative Detention) Act 2005*  
*Whistleblowers Protection Act 1993*

*Witness Protection Act 1996*

**Principal Act and amendments**

New entries appear in bold.

Year	No	Title	Assent	Commencement
2012	52	<i>Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012</i>	6.12.2012	20.12.2012 ( <i>Gazette</i> 20.12.2012 p5742) except ss 3—61, Schs 1, 2 & Sch 3 Pts 4—7, 9, 10 (cll 19 & 20), 11, 13—15, 19, 22, 24 (cl 76) & 25 (cl 79)—1.9.2013 ( <i>Gazette</i> 23.5.2013 p2006) and except Sch 3 Pt 2—24.11.2014 ( <i>Gazette</i> 20.11.2014 p6477)
2014	20	<i>Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2014</i>	27.11.2014	Pt 2 (ss 4—28) & Sch 1 (cl 3)—27.11.2014 ( <i>Gazette</i> 27.11.2014 p6554)
2015	34	<i>Judicial Conduct Commissioner Act 2015</i>	5.11.2015	Sch 1 (cl 7)—5.12.2016 ( <i>Gazette</i> 29.11.2016 p4525)
2016	54	<i>Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2016</i>	24.11.2016	Pt 2 (ss 5(1), (2), 6(2), 8—10, 12, 13, 15—19, 22—24, new Sch 3 (as inserted by s 25) & Sch 1 (cll 4 & 5)—16.12.2016; ss 4, 5(3), 6(1), 7, 11 & 14—1.4.2017 ( <i>Gazette</i> 15.12.2016 p4988); ss 20, 21 & new Sch 4 (as inserted by s 25)—15.7.2017 ( <i>Gazette</i> 11.7.2017 p2847)
2016	60	<i>Police Complaints and Discipline Act 2016</i>	8.12.2016	Sch 1 (cll 13—17)—4.9.2017 ( <i>Gazette</i> 29.8.2017 p3794)

**Provisions amended**

New entries appear in bold.

Entries that relate to provisions that have been deleted appear in italics.

Provision	How varied	Commencement
Long title.	amended under <i>Legislation Revision and Publication Act 2002</i>	27.11.2014
Pt 1		
s 2	omitted under <i>Legislation Revision and Publication Act 2002</i>	27.11.2014
s 3		
s 3(2)	substituted by 54/2016 s 4	1.4.2017
s 4		
s 4(1)	s 4 redesignated as s 4(1) by 54/2016 s 5(3)	1.4.2017
inquiry agency	(c) deleted by 54/2016 s 5(1)	16.12.2016
	<b>(b) deleted by 60/2016 Sch 1 cl 13(1)</b>	<b>4.9.2017</b>
law enforcement agency	amended by 43/2016 s 5(2)	16.12.2016
	<b>(e) deleted by 60/2016 Sch 1 cl 13(2)</b>	<b>4.9.2017</b>
publish	substituted by 20/2014 s 4	27.11.2014

seconded	inserted by 20/2014 s 4	27.11.2014
s 4(2)	inserted by 54/2016 s 5(3)	1.4.2017
s 5		
s 5(1)	amended by 54/2016 s 6(1)	1.4.2017
s 5(6)	inserted by 54/2016 s 6(2)	16.12.2016
Pt 2		
s 7		
s 7(1)	amended by 20/2014 s 5	27.11.2014
	amended by 54/2016 s 7	1.4.2017
s 8		
s 8(8)	amended by 34/2015 Sch 1 cl 7(1)	5.12.2016
s 8(8a)	inserted by 34/2015 Sch 1 cl 7(2)	5.12.2016
s 14		
s 14(4a)	inserted by 20/2014 s 6	27.11.2014
s 16		
s 16(1)	substituted by 20/2014 s 7	27.11.2014
s 16(1a)	inserted by 20/2014 s 7	27.11.2014
Pt 3		
s 17	amended by 54/2016 s 8	16.12.2016
	<b>amended by 60/2016 Sch 1 cl 14</b>	<b>4.9.2017</b>
s 18		
s 18(5)	inserted by 54/2016 s 9	16.12.2016
Pt 4		
Pt 4 Div 2		
Pt 4 Div 2 Subdiv 1		
s 23		
s 23(1)	amended by 54/2016 s 10	16.12.2016
s 23(3) and (4)	inserted by 20/2014 s 8	27.11.2014
s 24		
s 24(1)	<b>amended by 60/2016 Sch 1 cl 15</b>	<b>4.9.2017</b>
s 24(2)	amended by 20/2014 s 9(1), (2)	27.11.2014
	amended by 54/2016 s 11(1), (2)	1.4.2017
	(ab) deleted by 54/2016 s 11(2)	1.4.2017
s 25	amended by 20/2014 s 10	27.11.2014
Pt 4 Div 2 Subdiv 2		
heading	substituted by 20/2014 s 11	27.11.2014
s 28	amended by 20/2014 s 12	27.11.2014
s 29A	inserted by 20/2014 s 13	27.11.2014
s 31		
s 31(1)	amended by 54/2016 s 12(1)	16.12.2016
s 31(2)	substituted by 54/2016 s 12(2)	16.12.2016
s 31(7)	amended by 54/2016 s 12(3)—(6)	16.12.2016
s 31(8)—(10)	amended by 54/2016 s 12(7)	16.12.2016



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<i>s 31(14) before substitution by 54/2016</i>		
<i>private place</i>	<i>amended by 20/2014 s 14(1)</i>	27.11.2014
<i>private vehicle</i>	<i>amended by 20/2014 s 14(2)</i>	27.11.2014
s 31(14)	substituted by 54/2016 s 12(8)	16.12.2016
s 32		
s 32(3)	substituted by 20/2014 s 15(1)	27.11.2014
s 32(3a)	inserted by 20/2014 s 15(1)	27.11.2014
s 32(4)		
designated period	amended by 20/2014 s 15(2)	27.11.2014
s 36		
s 36(1)	s 36 redesignated as s 36(1) by 20/2014 s 16	27.11.2014
	amended by 54/2016 s 13(1)	16.12.2016
s 36(2)	inserted by 20/2014 s 16	27.11.2014
	amended by 54/2016 s 13(2)	16.12.2016
s 36(3)—(6)	inserted by 20/2014 s 16	27.11.2014
s 36(7) and (8)	inserted by 20/2014 s 16	27.11.2014
	substituted by 54/2016 s 13(3)	16.12.2016
s 36(9)—(11)	inserted by 20/2014 s 16	27.11.2014
Pt 4 Div 2 Subdiv 3		
heading	substituted by 20/2014 s 17	27.11.2014
s 36A	inserted by 20/2014 s 18	27.11.2014
s 36A(1)	amended by 54/2016 s 14(1)	1.4.2017
s 36A(2)	amended by 54/2016 s 14(2)	1.4.2017
<i>s 37 before substitution by 54/2016</i>		
<i>s 37(1)</i>	<i>amended by 20/2014 s 19(1)</i>	27.11.2014
<i>s 37(5)</i>	<i>deleted by 20/2014 s 19(2)</i>	27.11.2014
<i>s 37(6)</i>	<i>(c) deleted by 20/2014 s 19(3)</i>	27.11.2014
s 37	substituted by 54/2016 s 15	16.12.2016
s 38		
s 38(1)	amended by 20/2014 s 20	27.11.2014
	amended by 54/2016 s 16(1)	16.12.2016
s 38(2)	amended by 54/2016 s 16(1)	16.12.2016
s 38(3) and (4)	amended by 54/2016 s 16(2)	16.12.2016
s 38(5)	amended by 54/2016 s 16(1)	16.12.2016
s 38(6) and (7)	substituted by 54/2016 s 16(3)	16.12.2016
s 38(7a)	inserted by 54/2016 s 16(3)	16.12.2016
Pt 4 Div 4		
s 42		
s 42(1)	amended by 54/2016 s 17(1)	16.12.2016
s 42(1a)	inserted by 54/2016 s 17(2)	16.12.2016

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s 42(2)	substituted by 54/2016 s 17(2)	16.12.2016
Pt 4 Div 5		
s 43	amended by 20/2014 s 21	27.11.2014
s 44		
s 44(1)	amended by 54/2016 s 18(1)	16.12.2016
s 44(2)	amended by 54/2016 s 18(2)	16.12.2016
Pt 5		
s 45		
s 45(2)	amended by 20/2014 s 22	27.11.2014
	amended by 54/2016 s 19	16.12.2016
	<b>amended by 60/2016 Sch 1 cl 16</b>	<b>4.9.2017</b>
s 46	substituted by 54/2016 s 20	15.7.2017
s 48	amended by 54/2016 s 21	15.7.2017
Pt 6		
s 50	amended by 20/2014 s 23	27.11.2014
s 51	amended by 20/2014 s 24	27.11.2014
	<b>amended by 60/2016 Sch 1 cl 17</b>	<b>4.9.2017</b>
<i>s 54 before substitution by 54/2016</i>		
<i>s 54(1)</i>	<i>amended by 20/2014 s 25(1)—(3)</i>	27.11.2014
<i>s 54(2)</i>	<i>substituted by 20/2014 s 25(4)</i>	27.11.2014
<i>s 54(3) and (4)</i>	<i>deleted by 20/2014 s 25(4)</i>	27.11.2014
s 54	substituted by 54/2016 s 22	16.12.2016
s 56A	inserted by 20/2014 s 26	27.11.2014
s 56A(1)	substituted by 54/2016 s 23	16.12.2016
s 56A(1a)	inserted by 54/2016 s 23	16.12.2016
s 59		
s 59(1)	s 59 redesignated as s 59(1) by 54/2016 s 24	16.12.2016
s 59(2)	inserted by 54/2016 s 24	16.12.2016
Sch 1	amended by 20/2014 s 27	27.11.2014
Sch 2		
cl 3		
cl 3(9)	amended by 20/2014 s 28	27.11.2014
Sch 3	<i>omitted under Legislation Revision and Publication Act 2002</i>	27.11.2014
Sch 3	inserted by 54/2016 s 25	16.12.2016
Sch 4	inserted by 54/2016 s 25	15.7.2017

## Transitional etc provisions associated with Act or amendments

### *Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2014, Sch 1 Pt 3—Transitional provision*

#### 3—Application of section 15

Section 32 of the *Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012*, as in force immediately after the commencement of section 15 of this Act, applies in relation to a thing—

- (a) that is, immediately before that commencement, subject to a retention order under section 32; or
- (b) that has been seized under section 32 and that is, immediately before that commencement, being held pending the institution or finalisation of proceedings for an offence relating to the thing,

as if the thing had been made subject to a retention order or had been seized after that commencement.

### *Independent Commissioner Against Corruption (Miscellaneous) Amendment Act 2016, Sch 1 Pt 4—Transitional provisions*

#### 4—Exercise of powers of inquiry agency

If, immediately before the commencement of this Act, the Independent Commissioner Against Corruption was taking action in respect of a matter raising potential issues of misconduct or maladministration in public administration by exercising the powers of an inquiry agency, the *Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012*, as in force immediately before the commencement of this Act, continues to apply in relation to the matter unless and until the Commissioner determines to withdraw from exercising the powers of an inquiry agency in accordance with section 36A(3) of that Act (as so in force).

#### 5—Application of Schedule 3

Despite section 31(14) of the *Independent Commissioner Against Corruption Act 2012* (as in force after the commencement of section 12 of this Act), the provisions of Schedule 3 of that Act do not apply in relation to a warrant issued before the commencement of section 12 or any items seized pursuant to such a warrant.

## Historical versions

27.11.2014  
5.12.2016  
16.12.2016  
1.4.2017  
15.7.2017